The inclusion of stakeholders and the Locus Standi of the oppression remedy: a comparative analysis of South Africa and Canada by Maponga, Ruvarashe Dorothy
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 1 
 
 
 
 
RUVARASHE DOROTHY MAPONGA 
MPNRUV003 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY: COMMERCIAL LAW SPECIALIZATION 
 
THE INCLUSION OF STAKEHOLDERS AND THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE 
OPPRESSION REMEDY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA 
AND CANADA 
 
SUPERVISOR: HELENA STOOP 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of 
the requirements for the approved courses and a minor dissertation. The other part 
of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a program of courses. 
 
I Ruvarashe Dorothy Maponga hereby declare that I have read and understood the 
regulations governing the submission of dissertations, including those relating to 
length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this 
dissertation conforms to those regulations.  
 
WORD COUNT: 23 061 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………4 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...5 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of Research……………………………………………………………..6 
1.2 Structure of Dissertation ………………………………………………………….8 
1.3 Limitations of Study………………………………………………………………9 
CHAPTER TWO: EXPLORING SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND 
STAKEHOLDER INCLUSIVITY …………………………………...………………11 
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..11 
2.2 Shareholder Primacy………………………………………………………………11 
2.3 Stakeholder Inclusivity…………………………………………………………….12 
2.4 Defining the Stakeholders of a Corporation……………………………………….13 
2.5 The International Position on Stakeholder Inclusion……………………………....14   
       2.5.1 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance………………………………...15 
       2.5.2 Australian Experience…………….…………………………………………16 
       2.5.3 The United Kingdom Experience..…………………………………………..17 
       2.5.4 South African Experience……………….…………………………………..19 
                2.5.4 (i) King I to II…………………………..………………..……………19 
                2.5.4 (ii) Stakeholder Inclusivity in South Africa……….………………….20 
2.6 Summary…………………………………………………………………………...22 
CHAPTER THREE: THE OPPRESSION REMEDY 
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..23 
3.2 The Oppression Remedy in Canada: An Overview………………….……………24  
3.2.1 Locus Standi………….……………………………………………...…………..25 
                3.2.1 (a) (i) Group One: Security Holders………………………………….26 
                              (ii) Creditors……………………………………………………….27 
                        (b) Group Two: Directors and Officers………………….……………28  
                        (c) Group Three: ‘Proper Persons’……………….…………………...29 
3.3 The South African Oppression Remedy………………………………………..…30 
       3.3.1  Locus Standi in 1926…….………………………………………………....30 
       3.3.2  Locus Standi in 1973……………………………………………………….32 
 3 
       3.2.3 Locus Standi in 2008....……………………………………………………..34 
              (a) Directors…………………………………………………………………..35 
               (b) Shareholders………………………………...……………………………37 
(c) Related Persons…………………………………………………………38 
3.4 Summary…………………………………………………………………………..41 
CHAPTER FOUR: APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 
OPPRESSION REMEDY IN SOUTH ARICA 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..42 
4.2 Application and Interpretation of s 163: Selected Cases………………………..…43 
(a) Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd. v. Northern Cape Manganese Company…43 
(b) Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd…………………………………......44 
(c) Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v. Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd………………………….45 
(d) Count Gotthard S.A. Pilati v. Witfontein Game Farm………………………...…46 
4.3 Analysis…………………………………………………………………………….47 
      4.3.1 Widened Interpretation of s 163 ……………………………………………..47 
               (a) Court Remedies……………………………………………………….....48 
               (b) Guidance from foreign jurisdictions…………………………………….49 
               (c) Locus standi …………………………………………………………….50 
4.4 The influence of the principles of majority rule and non-intervention on s 163.52 
4.5 Summary………………………………………………………………………......54 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..55 
5.2 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………...56 
    (a) Intense Judicial Involvement……………………………………………………...60 
    (b) Watershed of alternative remedies………………………………………………...61 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..62 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation assesses the impact of the narrow interpretation and application of the 
oppression remedy in the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008, s 163 on the 
inclusion of stakeholders and compares it with the Canadian experience. It reviews the 
historical development of the oppression remedy in South Africa and focuses on how the 
interpretation and application of s 163 continues to exclude various stakeholders in the 
locus standi of the remedy. The comparative exposition of the interpretation and 
application of the South African and Canadian oppression remedy provided in this 
dissertation brings out fundamental differences between the two, highlights the need to 
extend the South African interpretation to include various stakeholders and elaborates on 
the benefits of a broader approach to the remedy.  By outlining the impact and benefits of 
the inclusion of various stakeholders in the remedy as opposed to their exclusion, the 
study advocates for a broadened and inclusive interpretation of s 163 by the courts to 
create a platform for various stakeholders to seek relief through the remedy. Furthermore, 
to minimize ambiguity in application of the remedy, the dissertation proposes a 
modification of the interpretation and application of s 163 to explicitly include all 
stakeholders in the description of oppression remedy building on the Canadian 
experience through judicial transplantation.   
 
Keywords: company, development, stakeholder, shareholder, stakeholder inclusivity, 
shareholder primacy, oppression remedy, locus standi, enlightened shareholder 
approach, judicial transplantation 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Overview of Research  
 
Company law as well as its interpretation have both evolved over time and the economic 
value generated for shareholders of a corporation is no longer (exclusively) used to guide 
and measure the performance of the business.1 Instead, the structure of companies is 
slowly evolving from being governed by the principle of shareholder primacy to 
corporations implementing different practices to ensure the inclusion of a greater number 
of stakeholders.2 Twenty-first century companies are no longer run on the premise that 
the shareholders being the owners of the company, should take absolute precedent over 
other stakeholders because they (the shareholders) run the risk of losing their investment 
if the company fails and their interests are not contractually protected3- the involvement 
and protection of stakeholder interests now plays an important role in the success and 
sustainability of the businesses. Thus, it has become difficult to separate the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders as these interests have become interrelated. To 
accommodate this, South African corporate law has moved towards a more stakeholder 
inclusive approach in the country’s corporate culture, the inclusion and protection of 
stakeholders’ interests played a key role in the revision and amendment of the Companies 
Act of 1973. 4  The following extract from the Department of Trade and Industry’s Policy 
report illustrates the next for this shift; 
 
  ‘It is proposed that in the South African context, the company law needs to take 
account of stakeholders such as the community in which the company operates, its 
customers, its employees, its suppliers and the environment in certain situations 
mandated by the Constitution and related legislation. Thus, it is proposed that in the 
running of a modern South African company consideration has to be given not only to 
                                                        
1  J Schulschek  Interveiw Summary Report (August 2012) Corporate Governance Research Program,  
Albert Luthuli Centre of Responsible Leadership  
2 King Report of Governance for South Africa (2009), Institute of Directors Southern Africa para 19  22 
(Herein referred to King III) 
3 A Ramalho Corporate Governance and the call to Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do Shareholders Loose Out, 
The Corporate Report  at 19 
4 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (Herein referred to as Act of 1973) 
 7 
economic factors but also to social and environmental ones. This is what King II refers to 
as a Triple Bottom Line approach.’5 
 
This revolutionary approach to the inclusion of stakeholders resonates in different 
provisions within the newly adopted Companies Act 71 of 20086- the new constitution of 
commerce in South Africa now includes the corporate culture, behaviour, and an 
exposition of the role of the company in society through corporate citizenship, 
sustainability, corporate investment and stakeholder inclusivity.’7 In an attempt to ensure 
the inclusion of stakeholders within the governance of companies, the Act of 2008 
includes a number of provisions that aim to deter and provide redress for the abuse of 
power within companies. Some of these provisions include; s 165, the statutory derivative 
action which gives directors,  prescribed officers, shareholders and registered trade 
unions the right to ‘… demand upon a company to commence or continue legal 
proceedings, or take related steps, to protect the legal interests of the company…’8 
Another example is s 162 which gives shareholders, the company, directors, the company 
secretary, prescribed officers and registered trade unions the right to ‘… apply to an court 
for an order declaring a person delinquent or under probation…’ 9  By providing 
stakeholders such as creditors, employees and trade unions with stricter statutory 
protection similar to the protection set for shareholders, is an indication of the shift in 
South African corporate law from shareholder supremacy to the more stakeholder 
inclusive governance of companies. The platform provided for the increased inclusion of 
various stakeholders in the governance of companies has reformed and narrowed the gap 
that exists between the shareholders and various stakeholders within companies by 
ensuring the protection of various stakeholder interests. 
Traditionally the oppression remedy, like ss 165 and 162, was introduced into the 
corporate realms to narrow the imbalance of power between minority and majority 
shareholders ie ‘… the interests of the various shareholders of a corporation may conflict, 
particularly where one shareholder or identifiable group of shareholders control the 
                                                        
5 South African Company Law of the 21st Century: Guidelines of Corporate Law Reform (May 2004), 
Department of Trade and Industry (Herein reffered to as DTI Policy Report) at 25 
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Herein referred to as Act of 2008) 
7 Schulschek op cit note 1 at 21 
8 s 165(2) of the Act of 2008  
9 s 162(2) of the Act of 2008  
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corporation and others are in a minority position.’ 10  Through the development of 
corporate law, the oppression remedy in many jurisdictions has evolved beyond the 
protection of shareholder interests only and now extends protection to the interests of 
various stakeholders. The South African oppression remedy, s 163, which is similar to ss 
238 and 241 of the Canada Business Corporation Act 11  and s 994 of the English 
Companies Act,12 has widened its locus standi to extend to the  protection of the rights 
and interests of directors. Despite the similarities between s 163 and the Canadian 
oppression remedy alluded to above, the Canadian remedy provides standing to a larger 
pool of stakeholders. It includes creditors, employees and any ‘proper person’ and this 
has contributed to the influence the remedy has on the inclusion and protection of diverse 
stakeholders interests within Canadian corporate culture. In South Africa however, the 
locus standi of s 163 is limited to directors and shareholders, which has excluded various 
stakeholders from seeking redress from oppressive conduct through this provision, and 
this may perpetuate the imbalance of power among company stakeholders. The exclusion 
of various stakeholders in s 163 denies the ‘powerless’ a platform to seek redress under s 
163. 
 This dissertation aims to provide an understanding on the historical development 
of the South African oppression remedy and illustrate how the narrow approach to the 
‘new’ oppression remedy, s 163, exposes that, to a certain extent, South African 
corporate culture continues to be centred on safeguarding the interests of those 
stakeholders, principally shareholders, that hold a direct and tangible interest within the 
company.  It is thus argued that, in South African corporate law the inclusion of various 
stakeholder interests continues to lag behind in a few aspects when compared with 
experiences elsewhere. The dissertation will provide a comparison between the 
application and interpretation of s 163 in South Africa and ss 238 and 241 in the CBCA 
and how two very similar provisions have provided different outcomes in terms of the 
inclusion of stakeholders. It will analyse the South African Companies Act s 163, cases 
and other secondary material and compare them with the Canadian experience. 
 
                                                        
10 KP McGuinness et al (1999) The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations at  949 
11 Canada Business Corporation Act RSC 1985 c C44 (Herein referred to as CBCA) 
12 Companies Act 2006 ch 46 (Herein referred to as the English Act) 
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1.2 Structure of Dissertation  
 
The dissertation is organized in five Chapters following this introduction.  
Chapter 2 deals with the principles of shareholder primacy and stakeholder inclusivity 
and discusses the transition of corporate governance models from being built on the 
former principle to the latter. The chapter examines how three selected jurisdictions, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Africa have incorporated the principle of 
stakeholder inclusion within their corporate frameworks.  
Chapter 3 discusses the oppression remedy in detail and provides a comparative 
analysis of the Canadian oppression remedy and the South African oppression remedy to 
tease out similarities and differences and hence the attendant strengths and weaknesses of 
both provisions. It explores how the use, interpretation and application of the oppression 
remedy in Canada has mirrored the principles of stakeholder inclusion in Canadian 
corporate law. The discussion also explores the historical development, interpretation and 
application of the South African oppression remedy throughout the years and the 
principles and guidelines that frame the remedy.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the interpretation and application of s 163 and considers the 
application of this newly adopted section by the South African courts. It elaborates on 
how the courts have contributed to limiting the remedy and how the remedy continues to 
be interpreted primarily in accordance to the protection of shareholder interests. Chapter 
4 goes on to discuss how traditional South African corporate law principles have further 
limited the flexibility of the oppression remedy.  
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The 
recommendations focus on how the South African courts can play a key role in ensuring 
that various stakeholders are provided with a platform for the protection of their rights 
and interests in s 163 without interfering with South African corporate culture The 
chapter further interrogates the implementation of a wider locus standi in South African 
corporate law and how this relates to the principles of the so-called enlightened 
shareholder approach.  
 
1.3 Limitations of Research 
 10 
 
 The extensive research undertaken to achieve the objectives of this dissertation 
was constrained by methodological limitations related to the comparison of the two legal 
systems.  As a methodology for comparison, comparative law is mainly functionalist in 
that it seeks to identify problems and the causes of legal change; to replace an existing 
law or search for a ‘better’ law and to assess which law offers the best solution to the 
problem.13 However, the comparative analysis does not consider the cultural and legal 
background of both jurisdictions before arriving at comparative conclusions. The 
dissertation assumes that both Canada and South Africa share similar problems and that 
enacting similar provisions would deal with what are presumed to be shared problems, 
which unfortunately may not be the case.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 P Legrad (1997), ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”', 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111 at 114 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXPLORING SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND STAKEHOLDER 
INCLUSIVITY 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses various issues around the primacy of shareholders and the 
importance of inclusiveness in the protection of the rights of the stakeholders of 
corporations. It elaborates on the transition of corporate governance models from 
shareholder primacy to stakeholder inclusivity. The discussion isolates important 
dimensions to the issues discussed in this dissertation.     
2.2 Shareholder Primacy  
 
Until the early 20th century corporations had been governed on the basic principle of the 
maximization of profits for shareholders. The traditional view of Milton Friedman was 
that, ‘[t]he purpose of a company is to make profits for stockholders, which means its 
stockholders are the one and only stakeholder group that managers should take into 
account when making a decision.’14 This was established in the historical American case 
of Dodge v Ford Motor Co,  
‘[Shareholder primacy is] a business corporation that is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profits of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction 
                                                        
14 AR Phillips  Stakeholder Theory: Impacts and Prospects (2011) at 2 
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of profits or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them 
to the other purposes.’15   
 
Scholars in favour of shareholder primacy argue that the economic value 
generated by a corporation has become a useful guide to measure the performance of the 
business and to allay fears regarding excesses by management16 and directors have been 
required to manage the business of the company in the interests of its shareholders and to 
maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders. 17   Although to date, a number of 
corporations have shifted from this traditional approach to corporate governance, 
principles of shareholders primacy continue to be engrained in contemporary corporate 
culture. However, in twenty-first century corporate culture, shareholder interests are 
protected differently and are included together with those of the various other 
stakeholders.  
2.3   Stakeholder Inclusivity 
 
Stakeholder inclusivity allows for the consideration of the interests of stakeholders other 
than those of the primary shareholders. It relates to the idea that the governance of a 
company should not be centred only on the protection of the financial interests of its 
shareholders but should include the protection of the interests of various stakeholders. 
The stake holding perspective emerged in the late twentieth century, and it views the 
corporations as a locus, in relation to wider external stakeholder interests rather than 
merely shareholders’ wealth.18 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance elaborate 
on the importance of stakeholder inclusion and state, ‘[c]orporate governance involves a 
set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders’ 19 - corporations are interdependent rather than independent social 
                                                        
15 Dodge v Ford Motor Co 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919) 
16 Phillips op cit note 14 at 3 
17 FHI Cassim The Duty and Liability of Directors in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 1 ed 
467 See also Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] CH 286 at 291 in which the court concluded that 
the phrase ‘company as a whole’ does not mean the commercial entity as distinct from the shareholders it 
means the shareholders or incorporators as a general body 
18 S Letza et al  ‘Shareholding versus Stakeholding:  A Critical Review of Corporate Governance’ in 
Corporate Governance: An International Review (2004) at 243 
19 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance (April 
2004) available at  http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf  at 
11(Herein referred as OECD principles) 
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institutions that corporate boards mediate, between networks of internal and external 
corporate interests. 20  Considering the interrelated concerns of various stakeholders, 
‘focusing on just one group of interests (that is shareholders) and debates about their 
primacy over others (that is stakeholders) misses the wider point that all of us are subject 
to higher level social contracts which govern our business relationships.’21 
2.4   Defining the Stakeholders of a Corporation  
 
To elaborate on the principle of stakeholder inclusivity, it is important to identify the 
various stakeholders that exist in any company. C Malin explains that the term 
‘stakeholder’ can encompass a wide range of interests; basically it is any individual or 
group on which the activities of the company have an impact.22 Other authors   emphasize 
that;  
‘[t]he fundamental idea that stakeholders have a stake in the same sense that 
business partners have a common stake in their venture or players on a team a common 
stake in the outcome of a game. Stakeholders share a common risk, a possibility of 
gaining benefits or experiencing losses or harms, as a result of corporate operations.’23  
 
An Australian lawyer elaborates on this thought;  
 
            ‘It may be suggested that each of these alleged stakeholders hold the following 
“stakes” in the company. In the case of employees it is an input of human capital 
particularly of long- term employees who have worked to consolidate specialist skills 
attributable to the company to assist with maintaining a successful business. The stake of 
suppliers is that they derive income from goods supplied to the company. The stake of 
owners is principally economic in the sense that they are relying on their shares in the 
company to produce a profit. The stake of the community is the need for a clean 
environment and boost to the economy through the provision of jobs and production of 
goods. Finally, the stake of creditors is that the business continues to perform well to 
ensure that the debts owed to the creditor are satisfied.’24 
 
Thus, in the broadest sense the term stakeholder defines those who have a 
relationship with the corporation either directly or indirectly ie those who are impacted 
                                                        
20 M Blair  et al  ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (2001) 85  VLR  at 265 
21 T Donaldson et al Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics (1999)  
22 C Malin Corporate Governance (2004) at 20 
23 JE Post et al Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and Organizational Wealth  (2002) 
at 19 
24 A Corfield ‘The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance: A preliminary 
Analysis’ (1998) ,  5 BLR 10 2 2 at 2 
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by the conduct of business by the corporation directly or indirectly. This broad 
description implies that apart from shareholders, stakeholders encompass employees, 
suppliers, customers, banks and other creditors, the government, communities, various 
‘pressure groups’- in fact anyone on whom the activities of the company may have an 
impact.25 
2.5   The International Position on Stakeholder Inclusion   
Internationally, corporations have implemented the notion of stakeholder inclusivity in 
diverse ways within respective corporate governance models.  With varying corporate 
regulatory structures, the notion of insider and outsider control and influence might 
combine with distinctions between shareholders and stakeholders in board and 
management representation. 26  Governments through corporate law and corporate 
governance principles have provided guidelines on how companies should manage 
stakeholder relationships. In almost every jurisdiction corporate governance aims to 
mediate three different kinds of ‘agency conflicts’27- between managers and shareholders; 
between majority and minority shareholders; and between the firm and third parties (that 
is, stakeholders).28  
There continues to be a debate within corporate governance circles as to the most 
effective legal instrument to implement in order to manage the agency conflict and 
govern stakeholder relationships ie  either through strict statutory regulations (eg the 
mandatory principles in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States) or by means of 
‘soft law’ (voluntary non-binding principles). Most countries seem to have adopted the 
soft law approach through the principles of ‘apply or explain’29 or ‘comply or explain.’30 
                                                        
25 JJ DuPlessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2005) 1 ed at 17 
26 OECD principles op cit note 19 at 36 
27 Agency conflicts relates to disputes that arise due to imbalance of power that characterizes corporate 
hierarchy  
28 JJ DuPlesis op cit note 25 at 29  
29  Adopted in South African corporate law through King III (the board of directors, in its collective 
decision-making, could conclude that to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular 
circumstances, be in the best interests of the company) 
30 Adopted in the United Kingdom Germany and the Netherlands (The European Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (July 2003)) notes that while it is expected that listed companies will comply with 
the Code’s provisions most of the time, it is recognized that departure from the provisions of the Code may 
be justified in particular circumstances)   
 15 
Soft law provides companies with flexibility and rejects the idea of ‘one size fits all’ to 
the principles of corporate governance. As noted by A Sridhar; 
‘[t]he merits of such flexibility are thought to lie in its ability to encourage 
companies to adopt the spirit of the Code, rather than the letter of the law, whereas a 
more statutory regime would lead to a “box-ticking" approach that would fail to allow for 
sound deviations from the rule and would not foster investors' trust.’31 
2.5.1   OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
When discussing the development of stakeholder inclusivity it is inevitable not to 
mention the principles laid out by OECD on the inclusion of stakeholders. 32  These 
principles have influenced the development of stakeholder inclusivity worldwide by 
providing a platform on how corporations can govern the relationships with its 
shareholders and various stakeholders. The OECD establishes the importance of 
protecting and regulating the interests of stakeholders.  Although the principles are non-
binding they have assisted corporations to shift from the traditional shareholder primacy 
model to the more stakeholder inclusive model to corporate governance. The OECD 
principles governing stakeholder relationships read: 
 The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual 
agreements are to be respected; 
 Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights; 
 Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be 
permitted to develop; 
 Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should 
have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular 
basis; 
 Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, 
should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical 
practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this 
[and] 
                                                        
31 A Sridhar et al ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working?’ 
(December 2005) Corporate Governance at LSE Discussion Paper Series at 1  
32 The principles of corporate governance laid out by the OECD have become a global benchmark for 
governing different issues relating to corporate governance. The principles are accepted in both OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Website available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf   
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 The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, 
efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights.’33 
 
These principles provide a comprehensive guide to how corporations can ensure that 
stakeholder interests are not only recognized but also protected either through corporate 
governance models, general corporate law rules or by both.  
The following section illustrates how these principles have been implemented in 
Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa in corporate law and corporate 
governance codes.  
2.5.2   Australia  
The Australian Government has provided corporations with guidelines to assist in the 
governing of stakeholder relationships. These guidelines have facilitated the transitioning 
of Australian corporate culture into a more stakeholder inclusive model of corporate 
governance.34  There is greater acceptance [by] Australian companies of the view that 
organizations can create value by the better managing natural, human, social and other 
forms of capital and it is important for companies to demonstrate their commitment to 
appropriate corporate practices. 35  The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) principles 
represent an attempt to develop a regulatory framework which promotes adherence to 
corporate governance best practice in response to a series of corporate collapses in the 
earlier part of this decade. 36  The ASX encourages companies to ‘[r]ecognize the 
legitimate interests of stakeholders – recognize legal and other obligations to all 
                                                        
33 OECD principles op cit note 19 at 21  
34 See JH Farrar ‘Corporate Governance and the Judges’ (2003) BLR 65 on the categorization of Australian 
corporate governance regulation- hard law, hybrid law and soft law. The hard law is Corporations Act 
2001, hybrid law are the Australian Stock Exchange(ASX) rules - (ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations, ASX Accounting standards and ASX Auditing standards) and soft law relates to the 
purely voluntarily ie (no formal sanctions arises from non-compliance)  codes and guidelines articulating 
benchmarks for what is considered best practice in corporate governance as well as scholarly and trade 
writings (in the form of books, reports and articles) that have some role in influencing companies to shape 
their internal arrangements and management to achieve best practice.  (See further discussion on Australian 
regulation through soft law in JJ DuPlesis et al Principles of Contemporary Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2011) 2 ed 170)  
35 DuPlesis op cit note 25 at 10 
36 Ibid at 29 
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legitimate stakeholders’37 and  listed companies should have a Code of Conduct that is 
aimed at addressing ‘matters relevant to the company’s compliance with its legal 
obligations to legitimate stakeholders.’38  
Australian corporate law consists of a large pool of guidelines to ensure the 
protection of various stakeholders’ interests in companies. These developments in 
Australian corporate governance have ensured a more prominent place for stakeholders in 
contemporary corporate governance, particularly in relation to listed companies. 39 
Companies are committed to protecting both the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders. An example of an Australian listed company that has implemented the 
several guidelines on governance of stakeholder relationships is Telstra Corporation 
Limited, a leading telecommunications company.  Telstra’s Code of Conduct is useful in 
highlighting the expected relationships between the corporation and its employees in (one 
stakeholder), and what is expected by Telstra employees in engaging other stakeholders 
to uphold and respect their rights.40  
The success of companies such as Telstra in the inclusion of stakeholders, 
illustrates how companies have responded to the Australian government’s positive 
attempt at providing guidelines for the governing of stakeholder relationships and its 
determination to revolutionize local corporate culture. It is important to note that, as is the 
case in most jurisdictions, the additional protection of stakeholder interests in Australian 
corporate culture extends to the wider scope of different legislation. 41  In addition to 
corporations being bound by corporate law and corporate governance principles, 
corporations are entitled to ensure that separate legal obligations on the protection of 
stakeholder interests are obliged with. The ASX guidelines acknowledge that;    
                                                        
37  Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (March 2003) available at http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-
compliance/principles-and-recommendations-march-2003.pdf  at 11  (Herein referred to as ASX principles) 
38 Ibid at 59 
39 DuPlesis op cit note 25 at 36 Australian corporate governance principles have evolved greatly in the 
twenty-first century and modern guidelines have been afforded to both listed and non-listed companies  
40  See Telstra Group Code of Conduct and Business Principle available at 
http://www.telstraglobal.com/attachments/article/440/934_Telstra_Group_Code_Of_Conduct_Business_Pr
inciples[1].pdf  
41  Environmental interests protection is provided for in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act) employee interests are protected through several national and  
provincial legislation eg the National Work 2009 and Queensland’s Health and Safety Act 2011 (QLD)   
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             ‘[m]ost companies are subject to a number of legal requirements that affect the 
way business is conducted. These include trade practices and fair dealing laws, consumer 
protection, respect for privacy, … In several areas, directors and officers are held 
personally responsible for corporate behaviour inconsistent with these requirements, and 
penalties can be severe.’42 
 
2.5.3   The UK 
 
Unlike Australia, stakeholder relationships in the UK are governed more extensively by 
corporate law, the English Companies Act of 2006. Traditionally, the primary duty of the 
directors in the UK was to protect the interests of their shareholders and no specific duty 
was imposed for the recognition of stakeholder interests beyond s 309 of the English 
Companies Act of 1985. The provision was limited to protection of employee interests,43  
the only formal recognition was given to stakeholders in the 1985 Companies Act. 
However, the English Companies Act of 2006 through s 172 governs the protection of 
various stakeholder interests through enlightened shareholder value approach. It is stated 
that;  
‘[t]he primary role of directors should be to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole, but that they should also recognize, as the 
circumstances require, the company's need to foster relationships with other stakeholders, 
its need to maintain its business reputation and its need to consider the impact of its 
operations on the community and the environment.’44 
 
Under the new framework, the primary goal of directors is to promote the success 
of the company in the collective best interests of the shareholders - however directors 
must take into account, where circumstances so require, non-shareholder interests when 
considering, in good faith, what will best promote the success of the company.45 The Act 
specifies on the protection of ‘… the interests of the company’s employees and [the] need 
                                                        
42 DuPlesis op cit note 25 at 36  
43 s 309(1) of Companies Act 1985 ch 6 which reads: [t]he matters to which the directors of a company are 
to have regard in the performance of their functions include the interests of the company's employees in 
general, as well as the interests of its members 
44 Company Law Review Steering Group: Modern Company Law for a Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Final Report paragraph 3.8 Available at www.dti.gov.uk\bbf\co-act-2006\clr-
review\page22794.html\ 
45 L Miles  ‘Company Stakeholders: Their Position Under the New Framework’ (January/February 2003) 
Amicus Curiae Issue 45 at 12 Available at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3507/1/1264-1320-1-SM.pdf 
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to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others.’46 
This however does not mean that the interests of stakeholders hold an independent value 
over those of a company’s shareholders but rather that the Act identifies the importance 
of maintaining stakeholder relationships.  This goes to prove that the corporate culture in 
the UK has evolved with the recognition of different groups of stakeholders and the 
governing of stakeholder relationships has become of paramount importance in the 
success of businesses.47  
 
2.5.4   South Africa 
 
In South Africa both corporate law and corporate governance principles govern various 
stakeholder relationships. The development of stakeholder inclusive principles can be 
tracked through the King Reports I, II, III up to the newly adopted Companies Act 71 of 
2008. The governance of stakeholder relationships in South Africa has shifted from being 
governed by a single bottom line approach48  to a triple bottom line approach.49  The 
importance placed on stakeholder inclusivity in the successive King Reports emerged 
from the recognition that both diversity across all levels of an organization and broad 
consideration of all the company’s relevant stakeholders is not only the businesses’ 
responsibility to society, but an opportunity to become more attuned, informed and, 
ultimately successful. 50 The following section briefly discusses the development of 
stakeholder inclusivity through the King Reports and the newly adopted Companies Act 
and illustrates how corporations implement the inclusion of stakeholders in the South 
African corporate culture.  
2.5.4(i)   King I to III 
                                                        
46 s 172(1)(b) and (c) of Companies Act 2006  
47 See further E Lynch (2012), ‘Section 172: a ground-breaking reform of director's duties, or the emperor's 
new clothes?’ Comp. Law 33(7) 196-203 The author addresses the question as to whether the newly 
adopted s 172 provides an entirely stakeholder inclusive approach to the Act. Whether there is any 
substance to this provision, or does it merely make the law appear more inclusive when, in fact, there has 
been no reform at all? 
48 Single bottom line approach the approach of business focusing on generating profits for shareholders See 
Duplesis op cit note 28 at 51 
49Triple bottom line or inclusive approach to governance means that the board should take into account the 
needs, interests and expectations of the stakeholders see King III at 2  
50 Schulschek op cit note 1 at 17 
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From the first King report in 1994, stakeholder engagement has become of utmost 
importance in South African corporate culture. With the increase in international 
commerce companies have become cautious in accounting for the interests of 
stakeholders. Mohamed Adam,51 in his interview for the Corporate Governance Research 
Program acknowledged that;  
          ‘[s]takeholder recognition was a critical driver [of] King I, it came around when 
there was recognition that stakeholders have a role to play in organizations and it must be 
one of the first sets of corporate governance principles around the world that started 
talking about stakeholders.’52   
King I can be labelled as the game changer of corporate governance principles not 
only in South Africa but across the continent and around the world.53   
Its [King I] principles went beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of 
corporate governance, advocating [for] an integrated approach to good governance in the 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders, having regard to the fundamental principles of 
good financial, social, ethical and environmental practices.54   
 
King I has been described as a ‘revolutionary’ report as it provided a very clear 
and extensive explanation of how companies in South Africa should account for the 
interests of stakeholders, and articulating the benefits that such an ‘inclusive approach’ to 
governance could provide companies with.55  In light of the extensive corporate failures 
of the early 2000s in the West, there was an immediate need to review King I to ensure 
that South African companies would not follow the same route.  In 2002 King II was 
born which was built on the foundation laid out in King I. King II further ‘… 
                                                        
51  Mr Mohamed Adam was a member of the King Committee of 2012 and played a pivotal in the 
compilation of King III 
52 Schulschek op cit note 1 at 7 
53 In explaining the global influence of the King Reports, Professor King in a verbal communication with 
Schulschek op cit note 1 at 9 said, ‘[t]he fascinating thing was how the King Report literally went around 
the world. As an example, in 2001 I was asked by Kofi Anan to Chair the UN Committee on governance 
and the problems that had started arising out of the food for all scandal. Similarly, a Japanese professor told 
me: “Judge King, I have got a book for you. It is in Japanese but this is your work translated in Japanese in 
1995. We have been teaching it in Japan since 1995.” I told the professor, “I am flattered, at which I am 
better known in Japan than I am in South Africa.” So that was quite assuming story, showing that the King 
Report really did go around the world. The King reports have sort of become a brand of corporate 
governance.’  
54 C Kneale  Corporate Governance in Southern Africa (2012) at  225 
55 DuPlesis op cit note 25 at 38  
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accommodated [for] the interests of stakeholders by recognizing the importance of the 
relationship between an enterprise and the community in which it exists.’56  
 
2.5.4(ii)   Stakeholder Inclusivity in South Africa 
 
Currently stakeholder relationships in South African corporate law are governed by the 
principles of King III and the Companies Act 71 of 2008. King III adheres to the similar 
principles on stakeholder inclusion as those in King II ie the triple bottom line.  Although 
King III advocates strongly for the inclusion of stakeholders, the interests of stakeholders 
and shareholders in South Africa corporate law are not pluralistic.57  The stakeholder 
inclusivity defined by King III is a means to stimulate appropriate dialogue between the 
company and its stakeholders, which could enhance or restore stakeholder confidence, 
remove tensions, relieve pressure on company’s reputation and align expectations, ideas 
and opinions on issues. 58 The shareholder does not have a predetermined place of 
precedence over the other stakeholders, but the interests of the shareholders or any other 
stakeholder may be afforded precedence based on what is believed to serve the best 
interest of the company.59 The stakeholder inclusivity principles outlined in King III 
illustrate how South African corporate law is evolving from the traditional view of 
shareholder primacy, to a corporate culture that views the corporations as more of a web 
of relationships. The principles in King III are binding to an extent,60 however generally 
companies have no specific obligation to adhere to the principles laid out in the Report.  
Like King III, the Companies Act advocates for the inclusion and protection of 
various stakeholder interests. Scholars have labelled the Acts’ principles on stakeholder 
                                                        
56 Schulschek op cit note 1 at  9 
57 The pluralistic approach to stakeholder inclusion holds that companies have a social responsibility to 
society and that shareholders are just one constituency among many and directors have a legal duty to 
balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, and must give independent value to the interests of 
stakeholders, whose interests are not subordinate to those of shareholders  See R Cassim ‘Corporate 
Governance’ in Cassim op cit note 17 at 449 
58 ‘Draft Report on Governance for South Africa’ (February 25th 2009) King Committee on Governance 
available at: https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/erm/documents/xx.%20King%203%20-
%20King%20Report.pdf at 111 
59 King III op cite note 2 at 11 
60 The principles of King III are strictly binding to companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) as they form part of the stock exchange listing requirements but remain voluntary for non-listed 
companies  
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inclusivity as an ‘enlightened shareholder value approach.’61 The enlightened shareholder 
approach shares similar principles to those of stakeholder inclusivity laid out in King III. 
F Cassim defines the enlightened shareholder value approach as; 
‘The interests of stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, 
the environment and the local community in which the company operates, are 
subordinate to shareholder interests. These interests may be taken into account only when 
it is in the best interest of the company itself. In the event of a clash between the interests 
of the shareholders and the interests of the stakeholder, it is the interests of the 
shareholders that must prevail.’62  
 
Stakeholder inclusion is governed by a few sections within the Act of 2008; s 
20(4) which establishes that trade unions have the right to institute proceedings to prevent 
the company from doing anything inconsistent with the Act; s 45(5) which allows trade 
unions to have access to financial statements for the purposes of initiating business rescue 
proceedings and must receive notice of any loan or financial assistance given to directors, 
prescribed officers or related or interrelated companies and perhaps one of the strongest 
messages the Act sends in support of stakeholder inclusivity is the establishment of social 
and ethics committees in s 72(4) and Regulation 43.63 The Act acknowledges that the 
interests of various stakeholders are of paramount importance but on wider scale 
stakeholders in South African corporate law look to separate legislation, for the 
protection of their interests. 64  An example is that there is more protection for the 
employee- employer relationship in the Labour Relations Act 65 , Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act66 and Employment Equity Act.67  Of course this may well 
be appropriate and all stakeholder related matters could not realistically be governed by 
company law.  
 
2.6   Summary 
  
                                                        
61 R Cassim  et al ‘The Reform of Corporate Law in South Africa’ (2005) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review at 412 
62 FHI Cassim Introduction to the New Companies Act: General Overview of the Act ch 1  in Cassim op cit 
note 17 at 18   
63 ss 20(4), 45(5), s 72 and Reg 43of Companies Act 71 of 2008  
64 Cassim op cit note 17 at 472 
65 Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1996 (including the amendments) 
66 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003 
67 Employment Equity Act No 55 of 1998 
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It is evident that corporate culture of the twenty-first century has evolved and stakeholder 
inclusivity now increasingly plays an important role in the success, growth and 
sustainability of companies. The inclusion of the interests of both shareholders and 
stakeholders has influenced positively the development of corporate culture nationally 
and internationally. However, in some jurisdictions such as South Africa and the UK, 
shareholders and stakeholders have not come to being regarded as equals in corporate 
culture but the move towards the inclusion of stakeholder interests is evident in these 
countries. Despite these important developments, shareholder primacy still forms the 
dominant part of the basis of the principles of modern corporate governance.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE OPPRESSION REMEDY 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Through the principle of stakeholder inclusivity, the interests of stakeholders are 
protected beyond corporate governance principles and legislation now anchors such 
protection. The oppression remedy is one such provision implemented in corporate 
legislation for the protection of various stakeholder interests and has generally altered the 
guiding principle in corporate decision-making ie the principle of majority rule.68 The 
remedy was traditionally introduced into corporate law as means of ensuring that the 
interests of minority shareholders were not suppressed by majority shareholders ie to 
dilute the principle of majority rule.  In Canada and South Africa the oppression remedy 
has extended beyond the protection of minority shareholder interests to the inclusion of 
other stakeholders. The new oppression remedy in South Africa, s 163 (the historical 
context of the section to be discussed later in this chapter), is similar in thrust to s 241 of 
the CBCA and s 232 of the Australian Corporations Act.69 The Canadian oppression 
remedy however is broader and applies to various stakeholder relationships. Some 
Canadian scholars argue that the broadness of s 241 has resulted in the displacement of 
traditional remedies and are being replaced by the flexible and procedurally simple 
oppression action.70 Section 241 of the CBCA has been labelled ‘… beyond question, the 
broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common 
law world … unprecedented in its scope.’71 N Abbey notes that the Canadian oppression 
remedy;     
‘…seeks to enforce fairness and equity, and is not limited to the enforcement of 
lawful conduct. The potential protection it offers corporate stakeholders is awesome.72 
This was the description of the oppression remedy under s 241 of the CBCA: it is hoped 
                                                        
68 See traditional English case  Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189  
69 Corporation Act 2001 (Australian legislation)  
70  JA VanDuzer The Law of Partnerships and Corporations (2003) at 327 This argument is further 
discussed in chapter five 
71 SM Beck  ‘Minority Shareholder Rights in the 1980’s’ in Corporate Law in the 80s (1982)  at 312 
72PH Dennis Shareholders Remedies in Canada (2009) at 17-1   
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that s 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act is considered as awesome as s 241 of the 
CBCA when compared to its predecessors.’73   
  
This chapter will discuss the historical development, interpretation and application of 
s 163 in South African corporate law and compare it to s 241 of the CBCA. It is 
instructive to compare the Canadian experience described in the previous section with the 
South African experience to isolate important differences with implications on corporate 
culture. The discussion will focus on the two provisions’ locus standi, the application of 
the remedy and how the remedy has played a role in the protection of various stakeholder 
interests in light of stakeholder inclusion.    
 
3.2   The Oppression Remedy in Canada: An Overview 
It is noted that in Canada the oppression remedy; 
‘...is not just a “shareholder remedy,” the courts have exploited the broad discretion 
contained in the [CBCA] and the statutes modelled after it to include creditors, 
employees and even the corporation itself … the oppression remedy represents an 
important enhancement in the position of creditors and other non-shareholder 
stakeholders seeking relief from corporate conduct’.74 
 The oppression provision in the CBCA reads;  
‘241. (1) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section; 
 (2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates; 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result; 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been 
carried on or conducted in a manner; or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may 
make an order to rectify the matters complained of ….’75 
Several provincial legislations have adopted an identical or similar oppression 
remedy to the rubric set out in the CBCA. An example is the oppression remedy set out in 
the Ontario Business Corporations Act. The relevant sections of the Act read;  
                                                        
73  NA Abbey, ‘An Insightful Study of the Oppression Remedy under South African and Canadian 
Corporate Law’ LLM  (Western Ontario) (2012) at 93 
74 VanDuzer op cit note 70 at 330 
75 ss 241(1) and (2) of the CBCA  
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‘248. (1) A complainant and, in the case of an offering corporation, the 
Commission may apply to the court for an order under this section;  
 (2) Where, upon an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect 
of a corporation or any of its affiliates; 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects or threatens to 
effect a result; 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are, have been or are 
threatened to be carried on or conducted in a manner; or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are, have been or 
are threatened to be exercised in a manner, that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer of 
the corporation, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.’76 
 This dissertation will solely focus on the oppression remedy laid out in the federal 
legislation, the CBCA.  
3.2.1   Locus Standi  
The intention of the Dickerson Committee77 in proposing the inclusion of the oppression 
remedy in the CBCA was the protection of minority shareholders in their capacities as 
shareholders, creditors, directors and officers,78 but as foregoing survey cases make it 
clear, the categories of person who have standing as complaints to seek relief from the 
oppression remedy under s 238 of the CBCA, which uses the language recommended by 
the Dickerson committee are much broader.79 The locus standi of s 241(1) is awarded to 
‘a complaint.’ The term complainant is defined in s 238 of the CBCA as;  
‘238(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or 
beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates; 
(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates; 
(c) the Director; or 
(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an 
application under this Part.’80  
 
‘[Thus], the term “complainant” … includes three [clearly defined] groups of 
corporate stakeholders. [The first group] includes registered holders and beneficial 
                                                        
76 ss248(1) and (2) of the CBCA 
77 The Dickerson Committee was a group of commercial lawyers scholars that advocated for the reform of 
Canadian corporate law in 1971 and influenced the birth of the CBCA of 1985 
78 RVW Dickerson et al ‘Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada’ (1971) available at 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/ic/RG35-1-1971-I-eng.pdf  at164 (Herein referred to 
as the Dickerson Committee)  
79 B Cheffins ‘The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience’ 10 JIL 350 at 341 
80 s 238 of  the CBCA 
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holders of corporate securities such as shares, bonds or debentures (“Group One”). [The 
second group] comprises of directors or officers of the corporation or its affiliates 
(“Group Two”). [The third group] is the basket clause made up of other persons whom 
the court finds to be “proper persons” to make an application (“Proper Persons”). 
Litigants falling within Group One and Two have standing in an oppression application 
as of right. However, those litigants falling outside those two groups must satisfy the 
court that standing should be afforded to them.’81 
3.2.1(a) (i)   Group One: Security Holders 
 
Historically the oppression remedy was introduced into Canadian law in response to the 
recognition that the position of minority shareholders was unsatisfactory under Canadian 
corporate law. 82  The main reason for this was that the protection for minority 
shareholders under the common law was inadequate83and there was lack of viable judicial 
or statutory remedies.84 The locus standi of the remedy has since developed beyond the 
protection of only majority and minority shareholder interests and grants generally all 
security holders’ locus standi, which includes certain categories of corporate creditors. 
As J Ziegel pointed out, ‘[i]t is obvious that the language of s 241(2) does not remotely 
reflect, a limited intention (for the remedy to be precisely for minority shareholders.)’85 
The locus standi of s 241 is thus widened to include the protection of the interests of a 
‘beneficial owners, and a former registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates.’ The term ‘affiliate’86 in s 238 has resulted in courts 
awarding locus standi to various stakeholders including; security holders that are directly 
or indirectly associated with a company: former shareholders’87  the minority shareholder 
of an affiliate, 88  shareholders who have invoked their appraisal rights in terms of s 
190(11) of the CBCA,89 applicants claiming a right to become security holders90 and in 
                                                        
81 P Macdonald et al ‘Creditors’ use of the Oppression Remedy and the Mareva Injunction to Protect 
Corporate  Assets’ at 2 Available at: 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/PMacdonald_Creditors_%20Use%20of%20the%20Oppression%20Remedy_
0609.pdf 
82 Dickerson Committee op cit note 78 at 160-62 
83  Cheffins op cit note 79 at 303 
84 Ibid   
85  JS Ziegel ‘Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution- An Anglo Canadian 
Perspective’43 UTLJ at 527 
86 Affiliate is defined in s 1 of the CBCA as  an affiliated body corporate within the meaning of subsection 
2  See further s 1 subsection 2 of CBCA for further interpretation of company affiliate  
87 Cheffins op note 78 at 311 
88 Moriaruty v Slater [1989] 67 OR.(2d) 758 (HCJ) 
89 Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc [1987] 60 OR (2d) 737 
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some circumstance debt holders.91 Although the remedy is wide and gives the courts 
unfettered discretion, it does not open the door to every disgruntled shareholder92 or 
security holder eg certain debt holders.93  
 (ii)   Creditors  
Until the introduction of the oppression remedy, a creditor was left with little recourse at 
common law. 94   The broad definition of ‘complainant’ in the CBCA now provides 
creditors with standing under s 241.95 Section 238 awards creditors with the platform to 
seek relief from oppressive conduct either as security holders or as mere creditors. 
‘Security’ is defined in s 2 of the CBCA as a share of any class or series of shares or a 
debt obligation of a corporation and includes a certificate evidencing such a share or debt 
obligation.96 Any person, who is a holder of a security as defined in s 2 of the CBCA, is 
awarded locus standi to bring a claim of oppression under s 241. If a creditor is not a 
holder of any security such a bond or debentures (known as simple creditors, those who 
do not have access to the oppression remedy as a right),97 the Act provides creditors with 
the platform to seek relief as ‘proper persons.’ In many creditor related cases under s 241, 
courts have been willing to recognise creditors, with the locus standi provided under the 
auspices of the oppression remedy.98   
                                                                                                                                                                     
90 Csak v Aumon [1990] 69 DLR. (4th) 567 (Ont.HCJ) 
91 Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and Orphans Fund v Telus Communications Inc. [2003] OJ No 128 
(QL) (Sup Ct) 
92 See Carrington Viyella v Taran (Que SC 1983) (unreported); Mason v Intercity Properties, 37 BLR  6, 
29 (Ont. CA 1987); Bernard v Montgomery, 36 BLR 257 261 (Sask. Q.B. 1987). 
93 Although debt holders have been awarded locus standi in certain instances ie in Metropolitan Toronto 
Police Widows and Orphans Fund v Telus Communications Inc [2003] OJ No 128 (QL)  the court in First 
Edmonton Place v. 315888 Alberta Ltd [1988] 40 BLR 28 at 60-62 determined that an unpaid landlord was 
not a security holder and hence did not have standing as a ‘complainant’ under s 241 of the CBCA   
94 Macdonald op cit note 81 at 1 
95 H Sutherland  et al  Company Law of Canada (1993) 6th  ed at 714 
96 s 2 of CBCA  
97 Macdonald op cit note 80 at 2 
98 See  Canada Opera Co v 670800 Ontario Inc  [1989] 69 OR (2D) 532 (HCJ) the court granted status to a 
creditor who had purchased a car, but not obtained possession, where the funds paid by the creditor had 
‘gone south’ from the corporation to an associate of the controlling shareholder; R v Sands Motor Hotel Ltd 
[1984] 36 Sask R 45 (QB) the crown was given status as complainant on the basis of being a creditor under 
the Income Tax Act where the ability of the Crown to recover income taxes owed by a corporation was 
impaired by dividends the corporation had paid to shareholders as discussed in VanDuzer op cit note 70 at 
338 
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Although the remedy has awarded the courts with a wide and unfettered 
discretion, the courts have limited the flexibility of the remedy in providing oppressed 
creditors with redress. In  Royal Trust Corp of Canada v Hordo  it was concluded that, 
‘[t]he courts discretion should be used to give “complaint” status to a creditor where the 
creditors interests in the affairs of a corporation is too remote or where the complaints of 
a creditor have nothing to do with the circumstances giving rise to the debt or if the or if 
the creditor is not proceeding in good faith…’99 It is evident that the oppression remedy 
may afford  creditors access to an array of relief the availability of the remedy is 
contingent upon demonstrating to the court that the simple creditor is a ‘proper person’ to 
bring the claim.100 
(b)   Group Two: Directors and Officers  
 
Section 238 extends the locus standi of the remedy to include the protection of directors 
and officers. 101  This inclusion has provided a platform for directors and officers to 
challenge the imbalance of power within corporations and in some instances protect 
against unfair dismissal. R Merchant notes that; 
 ‘[t]erminating any employee can have serious repercussions if not done correctly 
from a legal standpoint. Employers must recognize that terminating an employee who is 
also a shareholder of the corporation can be even more complex and that an oppression 
remedy is available to the employee/shareholder.’102  
 
The wide scope of the remedy and decisions of Canadian courts have created 
precedent for employees to seek relief in instances where employment has been 
terminated in an oppressive manner.103  By awarding protection to directors and officers 
                                                        
99  Royal Trust Corp of Canada v Hordo (1993), 10 B.L.R. (2d) 86 (Ontario General Division) 
100  Macdonald op cit note 81 at 18  
101 See s 2 of CBCA a ‘director’ is defined as ‘director’ means a person occupying the position of director 
by whatever name called and an officer is defined as an individual appointed as an ‘officer’ under s 121, 
the chairperson of the board of directors, the president, a vice-president, the secretary, the treasurer, the 
comptroller, the general counsel, the general manager, a managing director, of a corporation, or any other 
individual who performs functions for a corporation similar to those normally performed by an individual 
occupying any of those offices; This group of applicants are awarded locus standi under s 241 as a right.  
102 R Merchant   ‘The Oppression Remedy: Can it be used by a terminated employee who is also a 
shareholder?’ (October 2014) https://www.mcleod-
law.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/McLeod%20Law%20LLP_Employment%20Law%20Update_Oppression
%20Remedy_Oct%202014.pdf  at1 
103 The leading case in which a shareholding employee was granted standing is in Naneff v Con-Crete 
Holdings Ltd  [1993] 11 BLR (2d) 218 (Ont Gen Div) in which the trial court held that although ‘[i]n 
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Canadian courts have set precedent for the redress in oppressive conduct that results from 
the breach of the employee - employer relationships. The remedy focuses, ‘… on 
[providing redress for] harm to the legal and equitable interests of stakeholders affected 
by oppressive acts of a corporation or its directors.’104 
 
(c)   Group Three: ‘Proper Persons’ 
 
The use of the words ‘proper person’ in s 238(d) further illustrates the wide and 
unfettered discretion given to the courts through s 241. The term ‘proper persons’ 
provides the remedy with flexibility to grant any other ‘complainant’ not awarded the 
right to redress by s 238(a) to (c) with locus standi. The flexibility of the term ‘proper 
persons’ is validated by the courts. The Canadian courts continue to grant locus standi to 
simple creditors and to other non-shareholding stakeholders. Case law illustrates that 
simple creditors and employees have benefitted greatly from the discretionary freedom 
given to the courts by ss 241 and 238. The wide discretion given to the courts by the term 
‘proper person’ provides non- shareholding stakeholders the opportunity to ensure seek 
redress from oppressive conduct under s 241. In certain instances the courts have granted 
locus standi under s 241 to the corporation, to seek relief from oppressive conduct.105 It is 
important to note that to date s 241 is yet to be granted to a wider audience of 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and the environment.  However with ‘[t]he 
dominant viewpoint of Canadian judges that the oppression remedy should be interpreted 
broadly,’106 it is only a matter of time before the remedy’s locus standi widens further 
providing redress to a wider range of stakeholders.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
normal circumstances, the wrongful dismissal of an employee would not of itself provide the basis or 
standing to make an oppression remedy claim, in this case the dismissal was part of an overall pattern of 
oppression which the dismissal formed a part, thereby bringing conduct within the scope of the oppression 
remedy will be different from relief normally available in cases of wrongful dismissal’ and see also Murphy 
v. Phillips (1993) 12 BLR (2d) 58 (Ont Gen Div) the complainant was a non-shareholding employee and 
was granted standing to pursue a wrongful dismissal 
104 BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 S.C.R 560, 2008 S.C.C 69 A landmark decisions in 
Canadian corporate law that established that directors owe fiduciary duties to a wide range of stakeholders 
and directors may need to assess various interests when exercising their business judgment.  
105 The corporation was granted locus standi in two provincial decisions in which the court concluded  have 
held that the corporation itself may be a complainant; See Calmont Leasing Ltd. v Kredl (1993) 142 AR 81 
at 105 and Gainers Inc. v. Pocklington (1992) 132 AR 35 at 65-66 
106 This is the view of Judges in the application of the oppression remedy: Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., 
[1986] R.J.Q. 1073, 1077-78; Mason v. Intercity Properties, 37 B.L.R. 6, 12, 29 (Ont. C.A. 1987); Re 
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3.3   The South African Oppression Remedy 
 
3.3.1    Locus Standi in 1926 
 
Prior to the introduction of the oppression remedy in South African corporate law, the 
remedy awarded to a complaint seeking for relief from oppressive conduct was to 
ultimately wind up the company. The courts in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd described this 
remedy as ‘a cure that would be worse than the disease,’107 ie the remedy was rather 
extreme. The oppression remedy was first introduced into South African corporate 
culture in the Companies Act of 1926 in s 111bis - it was introduced as an alternative to 
the winding up the company. Section 111bis of the Act reads;  
 
‘111bis (1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company 
are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the member (including 
himself), may make an application to the Court...’108 
 
 The wording of the remedy in the Act of 1926 makes it clear that the provision 
could only be used by members of the company if they were jeopardized in their capacity 
as members.109 The member could not utilize the provision of the section if he was 
affected for example in his capacity as a director, creditor or any other capacity.110  And 
who were the members of a corporation?  According to s 24 of the 1926 Act a ‘member’ 
was; 
‘24.(1) The subscribers of the memorandum of a company shall be deemed to have 
agreed to become members of the company, and upon its registration shall be entered as 
members in its register of members; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp 43 OR2d 128 137 (Ont CA 1983); Chrysler Canada Ltd. v Richmond 
Plymouth (BCSC 1988)(unreported); Re Peterson v Kanata Investments Ltd 60 DL.3d 527, 542 (B.C.S.C. 
1975); Re Bury,12 DLR4th 451 453 (Ont HC.1985); Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs Ltd.20 DLR.4th 267 
275 (Ont.HC) 
107 Elder v Elder & Watson  [1952] SC 49  
108 s 111bis (1) of  Companies Act 46 of 1926 
109 A Sibanda ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company Law’(2013) JJS 
38(2) at 60 
110 Aspeck Pipe v  Mauer Berger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C):525 
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        (2) Every person who agrees to become a member of a company and whose 
name is entered in its register shall be a member of the company.’111  
 
It is clear that s 111bis was introduced into South African corporate law to continue 
to serve and protect member interests ie the interests of shareholders. Sibanda argues that;  
 
‘… under the Act of 1926 oppressive conduct pointed to a situation where the 
majority shareholders used their voting power unfairly in order to prejudice their minority 
counterparts or where they acted in a manner that made fair participation in the affairs of 
the company by minority members impossible112 - the disputed conduct was supposed to 
involve an element of wrongfulness that prejudiced the minority.’113  
 
Case law affirms this stance, in Elder v Elder & Watson the court emphasized that the 
oppression remedy was applied in cases where conduct involved a visible departure from 
the definitions of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his 
money to a company is entitled to.114  It is important to note that the Companies Act of 
1926 was implemented in an era where shareholder primacy was the governing principle 
of corporate governance, therefore it is only to be expected that the remedy established in 
s 111bis, ‘… involved [the] balancing of different rights and conflicting interests 
pertaining to majority and minority members respectively namely the exercise of 
majority voting power as opposed to the minority members’ right to fairly participate in 
the affairs of the company.’ 115  
The oppression remedy in South Africa was adopted to provide a platform for the 
relief of shareholders in companies, and this continues to be an underlying principle of 
the remedy throughout its development in the national corporate law. Section 111bis  
provided a platform for the members of a company to bring a complaint against 
oppressive conduct  and gave the court a wide discretion in s 111bis (2), ‘… with a view 
to bringing to an end the matters complained of, [and] make such an order as it thinks 
fit’.116It is evident that s 111bis was a remedy for shareholders alone.  
 
                                                        
111 s  24(1) and (2) of Companies Act 46 of 1926  
112 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 62 
113 Ibid at 62  
114 Supra at102 par 60   
115 Sibanda op cit note 108 at  63 
116 s 111bis(2) of Companies Act 46 of 1926 
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3.2.2   Locus Standi in 1973 
 
The relevant sections of oppression remedy of 1973 read as follows;   
‘252 (1) Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or 
omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable or that the affairs of 
the company are being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable 
to him or to some part of the members of the company, may subject to the provisions of 
subsection (2), make an application to the Court for an order under this section.’117 
 
The locus standi of s 252 was awarded to ‘any member.’ A member was defined in 
section 103 of the Act as;  
‘(1) The subscribers of the memorandum of a company shall be deemed to have 
agreed to become members of a company upon its incorporation, and shall forthwith be 
entered as members in its register of members; and 
(2) Every other person who agrees to become a member of a company and whose 
name is entered in its register of members shall be a member of the company.’118 
 
Like s 111bis, s 252 continued to provide locus standi of the oppression remedy to a 
‘member.’ This illustrates that the oppression remedy in the Act of 1973 continued to be 
a platform for the protection of shareholder interests. The prerequisite of locus standi 
under s 252 included subscription and registration to the memorandum of the company 
and in order for an applicant to be awarded locus standi the prerequisites of membership 
laid out in s 103 had to be fulfilled.119 Any complaint who was not a subscriber of the 
company’s memorandum or had not agreed to become a member or whose name was not 
entered in the register of members regardless of the act in question meeting the ‘unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable’ test had no standing under the provision. This was 
discussed further in the landmark case, Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd, where 
the court concluded that;  
         ‘…it is competent for a shareholder who has not obtained registration of his 
membership of the company because of opposition or lack of co-operation by the 
company or his fellow shareholders, but is entitled to such registration, to apply in the 
                                                        
117 s 252(1) of Companies Act 61 of 1973  
118 s 103(1) and (2) of Companies Act 61 of 1973  
119 See Lourenco v Ferela [1998] (3) SA 281 (T) discussion the  locus standi of s 252 any person who is 
appointed as the executor, administrator, trustee, curator or guardian of a member’s estate and whose name 
has been entered in the register as a nomine officii will also be deemed to be a member of the company … a 
person who is entitled to a share or in whom a share has vested in a representative capacity, but whose 
name is not entered in the register of members, will not have locus standi to bring an application under s 
252 at 249 
 34 
same proceedings for an order directing his enrolment on the register of members and, in 
anticipation of the grant of such an order, as a member for relief in terms of s 252…’120 
 
The oppression remedy in the Act of 1973 remained a platform to protect the 
interests of shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders continued to have no 
standing under the provision. Like the Canadian oppression remedy, the 1973 oppression 
provision on paper did not provide much guidance in certain instances and courts had to 
look to common law ie precedent set in s 111bis, for the further interpretation of the 
remedy. Section 252 provided a; 
 ‘… wider ground  [that] gives courts a greater measure of discretion than the 
common-law remedy, the likelihood is that discontented minority shareholders will resort 
to the former than the latter but that courts will continue to look to common law cases as 
providing some guidance as to the circumstances in which relief ought to be granted.’121  
 
This contributed to the continuance of the oppression remedy being a shareholder 
remedy as case law demonstrates that the conduct under the remedy in s 252 had to 
constitute an exception to the rule outlined in the case of Foss v Harbottle, particularly 
the ability of majority to bind the minority,122 in order to fall within the ambit of s 252. 
The purpose of the section remained to afford equitable relief to any members of a 
company who have a legitimate complaint of any act or omission by the company or of 
the conducting of its affairs which is prejudicial, unjust or inequitable towards them.123 
The section was predominately used in cases that involved the abuse of power by 
majority shareholders against the interests of minority shareholders.124 With the narrow 
approach and interpretation of the oppression remedy, s 252 did not make provision for 
an action by directors, employees or creditors who were not members of the company at 
the time of the application125 - the provision could only be used by a person who was 
prejudiced in his capacity as a member of the company. 126  The application of the 
                                                        
120 Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd [2008] 2 All SA 272 (C); 2008 (3) SA 663 (C)  
121 PA Delport et al Hahlo’s South African Company Law Through Cases: A Source Book (1999) at 539 
122 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 64 
123 The purpose of s 252 is discussed in these cases among others, Lourenco and Others v Ferela Ltd  (No 
1) 1998 (3)SA 281 (T); Ben-Tovim v Ben: Tovim 2001 (3} SA 1074 (C) 
124 See Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd [1979] (2) SA as discussed in Sibanda op cit note 
109 at 68 the remedies major advantage was that it put the conduct of majority members under the strict 
scrutiny of other members instead of being overshadowed by the mere fact that the will of the majority 
always prevailed and see also Samuel v. President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd [1969] (3) SA 629 (A) 
125 See discussion in Exparte Avondon Trust (Edms) Bpk 1968 (1) SA 340 (T):342 
126 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 65 
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oppression remedy from 1926 to 1973 South African corporate law was solely built on 
the protection on shareholder interests in accordance with shareholder primacy as a 
model of corporate governance.127  
 
3.2.3   Locus Standi in 2008 
 
The oppression remedy in the Act of 2008 and was adopted into South African corporate 
law at a time when;    
              ‘…both the domestic and global environment [had] changed dramatically. Many 
of the      traditional company law doctrines and concepts inherited from the 19th century 
England have been abandoned or substantially modified. New corporate law concepts 
have been developed such as solvency and liquidity, new higher standards of corporate 
governance, new standards of accountability, disclosure and transparency … The 
underpinning principle is that legislation that has outlived its usefulness and that is 
stifling the development of the economy must be repealed.’128 
 
       As discussed, traditionally the oppression remedy operated as a mechanism for the 
protection of minority shareholders129- the remedy has developed beyond this under s 
163. The oppression remedy now reads as follows;   
            ‘163. (1) A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to court for relief if  
(a) any act or omission of the company, or a related person has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of the 
applicant; 
(b) the business of the company, or a related person is being or has been carried on or 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests off, the applicant or  
(c) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related to 
the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant.’130 
 
The scope of s 252(1) of the 1973 Act has been considerably widened by s 163(1), as 
history has proved s 252(1) to be ineffectual due to its scope being too narrow and its 
                                                        
127 As discussed by Sibanada op cit note 108 at 64 case law on s 111bisI and s 252 although adjudicated 
under different legislation the courts advocated for the ‘narrow’ definition of oppression within the context 
of instances where majority shareholders used their voting power to unfairly prejudice their minority 
counterparts other conduct that unfairly disregarded the interests of shareholders was likely to be rejected 
as oppressive  
128 Cassim op cit note 17  at 3 
129 Ibid at 683 
130 s 163(1) of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
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requirements being too stringent.131 Section 163 has in some way attempted to fill the 
gaps and weakness of the oppression provision that arose from the application of the 
remedy under ss 111bis and 252.  The significant changes made to the oppression remedy 
are that it has widened the locus standi, widened its scope and provided the courts with a 
list of non-exhausted remedies that are available to complainants. Section 163 now 
provides relief for applicants other than shareholders ie the locus standi extends to 
directors and the shareholders and directors of ‘related persons.’  
(a) Directors  
 
Prior to the Act of 2008 directors were not offered redress through the oppressive 
remedy. However, the remedy has been widened to include the protection of directors’ 
interests. Directors are the only stakeholders awarded locus standi under this provision- 
‘…not creditors or employees.’132 A director is defined in s 1 of the Act as, ‘a member of 
the board of a company as contemplated in section 66, or an alternative director of a 
company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate 
director by whatever name designated.’133  
Section 66 provides a further definition of what constitutes a director in the Act. The 
relevant portions of section 66 provides as follows; 
‘66. (4) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation- 
(a) may provide for- 
(i) ... 
(ii) a person to be an ex officio director of the company as a consequence of that person 
holding some other office, title, designation or similar status, subject to subsection 
(5)(a);or 
(iii) ... 
(5) A person contemplated in subsection (4)(a)(ii)- 
(a) may not serve or continue to serve as an ex officio director of a company, despite 
holding the relevant office, title, designation or similar status, if that person is or becomes 
ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69; and 
(b) who holds office or acts in the capacity of an ex officio director of a company has all 
the- 
(i) powers and functions of any other director of the company, except to the extent that 
the 
                                                        
131 C Stein et al New Companies Act Unlocked: A Practical Guide (2011) at  367  
132 Cassim op cit note 17 at 681 
133 s 1 of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
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company’s Memorandum of Incorporation restricts the powers, functions or duties of an 
ex 
officio director; and 
(ii) duties, and is subject to all of the liabilities, of any other director of the company. 
(7) A person becomes a director of a company when that person- 
(a) has been appointed or elected in accordance with this Part, or holds an office, title, 
designation or similar status entitling that person to be an ex officio director of the 
company subject to section (5) (a) and  
(b) has delivered to the company a written consent written consent to serve as its 
director.’134  
 
 Section 163 grants locus standi to generally all directors including alternative and 
de facto directors. The extension of the locus standi in s 163, to not only protect 
shareholder relationships but extend to protecting the relationship that exists between 
directors, shareholders and the company is a significant extension of the ambit of 
oppression remedy. In most instances directors do not hold similar financial interest in 
the company like that of shareholders -  the accommodation of directors in the scope of s 
163 caters for a quasi-partnership where members occupy management positions and 
receive their investment returns in the company through remuneration.135 The principle of 
quasi- partnership is defined as; 
         ‘…some arrangement, express, tacit or implied, there exists between the members 
in regard to the company’s affairs a particular personal relationship of confidence and 
trust similar to that existing between partners in regard to the partnership business. If by 
conduct which is either wrongful or not as contemplated by the arrangement, one or more 
of the members destroys that relationship, the other member or members are entitled to 
claim that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.’136 
      
       The remuneration received by directors is but one example of the fact that directors 
may often have similar interests to shareholders vested interested in the company which 
calls for protection through s 163. Section 163 provides directors with a platform to 
contest oppressive conduct from the breach of quasi-partnership. Traditionally in 
company law minority shareholders were regarded as the most vulnerable stakeholders 
affected by the abuse of power from majority shareholders hence the introduction of the 
oppression remedy. However, the development of corporate law has shown that various 
                                                        
134 s 66(4), (5) and (7) Companies Act 71 of 2008  
135 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 71 
136 See Apco Africa (Pty) Ltd v Apco Worldwide Inc 2008 (5) SA 615 (SCA) 
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interests are in need of protection from the abuse of power within companies. The 
extension of the locus standi to include directors is evidence of the revolution of 
company law and s 163 seeks to protect directors from the abuse of power. The inclusion 
of directors in s 163 is in accordance with the aims of the Act ie to reaffirm the concept 
of the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits137 and balance the 
rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within the companies.138 Although 
directors have been awarded locus standi under s 163 the conduct complained of needs to 
have affected him (or her) in such capacity as a director, and not for instance as a 
creditor.139  Case law is still to develop further on the interpretation and application of s 
163 as a remedy for oppressive conduct for directors. 
  
(b) Shareholders  
 Like its predecessor, s 163 continues to award locus standi to shareholders. A 
shareholder is defined in s 1 as a‘… holder of a share issued by a company and who is 
entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated securities register as the case may 
be.’140 The term ‘certified securities register’ is not defined in the definition section of the 
Act but one would assume it to mean the opposite of ‘uncertified securities register.’  An 
uncertified securities register is defined as, ‘… the record of uncertified securities 
administered and maintained by a participant or central securities depository, as 
determined in accordance with the rules of a central securities depository, and which 
forms part of the relevant company’s securities register established and maintained….’141 
Thus, the locus standi of shareholders extends to shareholders entered in either certified 
or uncertified securities register. The registration of shareholding continues to be a 
pivotal pre-requisite for shareholder applicants under s 163. 142  The locus standi of 
shareholders under s 163 is similar to that granted by its predecessors as, ‘… courts will 
continue to look to common law cases as providing some guidance as to the 
                                                        
137 s 7(d) of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
138 s 7(i) of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
139 Cassim op cit note 17 at 684 
140 s 1 of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
141 s 1 of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
142 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 71 
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circumstances in which relief ought to be granted,’143 Unlike s 241 of the CBCA that 
awards standing to generally all security holders, 144   beneficial owners of securities 
continue to lack standing under s 163.  
          Cassim et al argues that although beneficial security owners are denied standing 
under s 163, the wording of the section has widened to include the protection of 
shareholder and director interest145 - which has been used as a useful illustration of the 
distinction between the rights and interests of shareholders.146 Despite the expansion of s 
163 most of the cases dealing with the oppression remedy are focused on conduct that 
will be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of the 
shareholder applicants although s 163(1) expressly provides that directors may also use 
the protection in terms of the provision. 147 It is evident that in South African corporate 
law the oppression remedy continues to be a provision that is used predominantly if not 
exclusively by shareholders to ensure the protection of their vested interests.  
(c) Related Persons 
Section 163 has widened the locus standi of the remedy by granting locus standi to 
‘related persons.’  The inclusion of actions by related parties and or a director of those 
related parties is a wide extension of the remedy in comparison to s 252 of 1973.148 The 
inclusion of related persons recognizes the development and influence of commerce in 
South Africa’s economic growth.  The term ‘related’ is defined in s 1 and, ‘…when used 
in respect of two persons, means persons who are connected to another in a manner 
contemplated in s 2(1) (a) to (c).’149 A ‘related person’ is further defined to mean;  
 ‘ (1) For all purposes of this Act- 
(a) an individual is related to another individual if they- 
(i) are married, or live together in a relationship similar to a marriage; or 
                                                        
143 PA Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2014) at 569 
144 Cassim op cit note 17 at 682 
145 The unfair disregard of the ‘interests’ of the applicant did not previously form part of the oppression 
remedy – its explicit inclusion under the Act arguably indicates that even where the conduct complained of 
does not affect any rights of the applicant as derived for instance from the Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation the applicant will still have locus standi if the applicants interests are 
affected. MF Cassim Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection ch 16 in Cassim op cit note 16 at 685 
146 Sibanda op cit note 109 at 71 
147 Cassim op cit note 17 at 682  
148 Delport op cit note 143 at 569  
149 s 1 of Companies Act 71 of 2008 
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(ii) are separated by no more than two degrees of natural or adopted consanguinity or 
affinity; 
(b) an individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly 
controls the juristic person, as determined in accordance with subsection (2); and 
(c) a juristic person is related to another juristic person if- 
(i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the other, as 
determined in accordance with subsection (2); 
(ii) either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
(iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of them, 
as determined in accordance with subsection (2).’150 
        Section 163 provides a platform for applicants to seek relief from oppressive 
conduct in instances where the conduct is an effect of an entity directly or indirectly 
related to the company. The expansion of the remedy to include related persons confirms 
that an act by an individual authorized by the board, managing directors or prescribed 
officers whose powers may form the subject of s 163, including persons who despite not 
being directors of the company enjoy some degree of authority.151 ‘[The definition of 
‘related persons’ in s 2 illustrates that] one could qualify as an applicant [of s 163] if one 
is inter alia a shareholder or a director either of the relevant company or of a juristic 
person related to the company,’ 152  in some instances may include individuals who 
directly or indirectly control the company153 eg through marriage.  
 Courts have referred to other provisions aside from s 2 of the Act in order to 
determine the relatedness of separate entities. The court in Peel v Hamon J & C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd (discussed in detail in following chapter) noted that looking to 
separate legislation for the further interpretation of ‘related persons,’  ‘… will always 
play an important role in considering the relief sought in terms of s 163.’154 South African 
courts will look beyond the Companies Act in order to fully interpret the scope of the 
remedy – to avoid limiting it.  The expansion of the locus standi of s 163 to include the 
conduct of ‘related persons’ is a positive move in South African corporate law - 
expressing that oppressive conduct resulting from acts or omissions of   ‘related persons’ 
                                                        
150 s 2(1) (a), (b) and (c) of Companies Act 71 0f 2008  
151 Cassim op cit note 17 at 684 
152 Ibid  
153 Ibid  
154  Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ)  para 60- the Judge noted that the 
definitions of ‘related persons’ in s 75(1) (b) of the Companies Act and s 1 of the Co-operative Banks Act 
40 of 2007 may be helpful in determining when an entity is related to another- case to be discussed in detail 
further 
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as grounds for relief under s 163 has addressed the weaknesses arising from its 
predecessors.155 Cassim et al notes that;  
                ‘The concept of a related person, as defined in s 2 of the Act, embraces a holding 
company and a subsidiary relationship, as well as direct or indirect control of company or its 
business(or the direct or indirect control) of each of them by a third person. The extension of 
locus standi to include shareholders (and directors) of related persons constitute a distinct 
improvement on the 1973 Act. Section 163 extension of the locus standi to include shareholders 
and directors of related persons constitutes a distinct improvement on the 1973 Act and it takes 
account of pertinent judicial decisions and issues that arose from time to time whether an 
applicant could complain of the conduct of the affairs of a subsidiary company thereby narrowing 
down the possibilities of the evasion of the section.’156 
       The expansion of s 163 now makes it clear that in appropriate cases, and provided 
that the other elements of the oppression remedy are satisfied, they indeed do so, allows 
an applicant to complain of the conduct of the affairs of a parent company. 157 
 
3.4   Summary 
The Canadian oppression remedy and the South African oppression remedy share several 
similarities ie both award directors and shareholders locus standi, the test for oppressive 
conduct- (oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards interests), holding juristic 
persons directly or indirectly related to the company accountable for oppressive and 
provide a list of non-exhaustive remedies. The broadness and flexibility that characterizes 
the oppression remedy in the CBCA and the application of the remedy by the Courts has 
created a platform for the inclusion of various stakeholders both shareholding and non-
shareholding to seek redress from the remedy. As alluded to earlier, the Canadian 
oppression remedy is not limited to shareholders and directors as s 163, but is available to 
a wider group of potential applicants. 158  The use of the term ‘proper person’ has 
influenced the protection of a wider group of interests beyond those of the shareholders. 
The Canadian courts have been willing to grant locus standi to various groups that would 
not have had any status to seek relief under corporate law before the introduction of the 
oppression remedy ie former shareholders, persons with contractual claims to be issued 
                                                        
155 Cassim op cit note 17 at 691 
156 Cassim op cit note 17 at 684 
157 Ibid 
158 Delport op cit note 143 at 569 
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shares, creditors, and dismissed employees.159 This discretion given to the Courts has 
been described as, ‘… a grant to the Court of a broad power to do justice and equity in 
the circumstances of a particular case where a person who otherwise would not be a 
complaint ought to be permitted to bring an action … to obtain compensation.’160 As 
corporate law continues to develop there is a possibility that the oppression remedy in 
Canada will be used to protect the interests of various stakeholders beyond creditors and 
employees.  
          In South Africa, the oppression remedy has undergone significant evolution since 
1926 with the expansion of the oppression remedy’s locus standi to include directors, the 
widened scope ie conduct that is either oppressive, unfair prejudicial or unfairly 
disregards and the non-exhaustive list of remedies. Unlike s 241 of the CBCA, the 
wording of s 163 expressly protects only the interests of those stakeholders that hold a 
vested interest in the operations of the company. With the wide discretion given to the 
courts in s 163, common law continues to play a significant role in the interpretation and 
application of s 163.  It is not expressly required by [the South African remedy] that the 
interests of the applicant should be disregarded or affected in any particular capacity e.g. 
interests in their capacity as shareholder or director,161  the interpretation of s 163 is 
greatly influenced by decisions adjudicated prior to s 163 in and the courts set precedent 
to that accord which will continue to apply. The subsequent chapter discusses the 
interpretation and application of s 163 by the courts to date. This discussion will disclose 
whether the South African oppression remedy has evolved to ensure the protection of 
various stakeholder interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
159 VanDuzer op cit note  70 at 342 
160 First Edmonton Place Ltd. V. 31588 Alberta Ltd. (1989) 40 BLR 28 at 62 
161 Delport op cit note 143 at 574(2) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1   Introduction 
As noted in the previous Chapter, the Canadian oppression remedy in s 241 of the CBCA 
provides a wide scope for the locus standi in Canadian corporate law. Canadian courts 
have exercised their discretion to further widen the locus standi of the remedy to open the 
remedies applicability to various stakeholders such as creditors and employees. It is noted 
that;  
       ‘[t]he key aspect of the Canadian oppression remedy is its growth from the Ebrahimi 
v Westbourne Galleries Ltd162 case, to a wide remedy that seeks to enforce reasonable 
expectations of shareholders - the enforcement of the reasonable expectations is only 
possible where there is a clear statute. A statute that provides for the clear legal rights of 
the individuals in a corporation is required.’163  
 
The question is as to whether the newly adopted oppression remedy in the South African 
Companies Act provides a similar platform for the ‘clear legal rights of the individual in 
a corporation,’ as described by N Abbey. Section 163 of the South African Companies 
and s 241 of the CBCA are both broad in wording, but their application differs 
significantly.  In order to illustrate this distinct difference in the interpretation and 
application of similar provisions, it is instructive to discuss a few cases that have been 
adjudicated under s 163. This will assist in determining whether South African courts 
have interpreted and applied the remedy in a way that has broadened the remedy or 
limited it. The Chapter discusses selected cases to illustrate the interpretation of the 
oppression remedy in the South African courts and juxtaposes this with the experience in 
Canada on the remedy.  The rest of the Chapter will further confer on the expansion of s 
163 and the role of the courts in the narrow interpretation of the remedy.    
 
4.2   Application and Interpretation of Section 163: Selected Cases 
 
                                                        
162 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 is an English case on the rights of minority 
shareholders and the traditional principle of the winding up of a company  
163 Abbey op cit note 73 at 123  
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(a) Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd. v. Northern Cape Manganese Company164  
 
 This case involves a dispute arising between the shareholders of Northern Cape 
Manganese Company (NCMC). Kudumane was a minority shareholder holding 49% 
interest in the company and NWC Mangenese (Propriety) Limited (NWC) being the 
majority shareholder, holding 51% interest in the company. There had been infighting 
within the company and Kudumane claimed that the infighting and the pending litigation 
hampered the ability of NCMC to conduct the affairs for which it was constituted thereby 
prejudicing the commercial rationale for its existence.165 As a result of the infighting, the 
status of directorship in the company had become uncertain and the minority Kudumane 
had brought a complaint under s 163.  
 Kudumane sought for the removal of all directors from the board except one of 
the director appointed by NWC and had asked the court to appoint a new board of 
directors all together until the issues in the company had been resolved.  The court ruled 
in favour of Kudumane granting a temporary decision regarding the directorship of the 
company while the final outcome of the pending litigation was finalized. In addressing as 
to whether Kudumane as a minority shareholder in NCMC could bring a claim under s 
163, judge Satchwell concluded that; 
     ‘[i]n my view Kudumane has discharged the onus to prove the necessary facta 
probanda. I am satisfied that Kudumane has the locus standi to approach this court for 
relief in terms of s 163 of the Act. Kudumane is a minority shareholder. The actions of 
NWC in the Kimberley litigation has had a result that the affairs of NCMC, and hence of 
Kudumane, are being oppressed and unfairly prejudiced and unfairly disregarded.’166      
 
         The conclusion made by the court in this decision clarifies two significant points. 
Firstly, that like its predecessors, the oppression remedy under s 163, continues to be a 
remedy for shareholders and extends to both majority and minority shareholders- Judge 
Satchwell makes it clear that as long as the shareholder is a shareholder as defined in s 1 
of the Act, the oppression remedy awards them with locus standi. Secondly, the case 
clarifies that relief is granted in instances where the applicants’ interests have been 
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oppressed, unfairly prejudiced or unfairly disregarded.  The court granted the minority 
shareholder locus standi under s 163 specifically in his capacity a minority shareholder. 
 
(b) Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd167 
 
The decision of the court in Peel confirms the expansion of the locus standi of s 163 with 
the inclusion of directors and related persons. The case involved two shareholders 
seeking relief from oppression through s 163 in their capacity as shareholders and 
directors. The shareholders and directors of the company in question, Peel Senior, Peel 
Junior, Pandela Duduzile and Quari Gillian sought to end the company’s corporate 
relationship with Hamon SA in the joint venture, Hamon J & C Engineering. The 
applicants argued that the sale and transfer of shares to two employees, in Hamon SA was 
to improve the employment status in terms of the Black Economic Employment Act 53 of 
2003 and that the transaction was ‘clearly was not a genuine transaction’168   
         The locus standi of the second applicant, Peel Senior, came into question as he was 
neither a director nor a shareholder of Hamon J&C Engineering at the time the relief was 
sought. Although Judge Moshidi dealt in detail with the interpretation of s 163, his 
analysis made it clear that the locus standi of s 163 in application does not extend to non-
shareholders or non-directors. This meant that Peel Senior did not have standing under s 
163 as he was neither a director nor shareholder in Hamon J&C Engineering as stipulated 
by the Act. Relief granted under s 163 relates to the conduct complained of affecting the 
applicant in their capacity as a director or shareholder. The honourable judge further 
elaborated on the relationship that exists between the conduct of related persons as 
defined by s 2 and s 163. The court reiterates what is noted by Jooste that, ‘… a proper 
construction to the words, “related and inter-related persons and control”, as set out in s  
2, will always play an important role in considering relief sought in terms of s 
163.’169Beukes et al however point out that the fact related persons are awarded locus 
standi does not mean that the oppression remedy is available to applicants in 
                                                        
167 Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ)  
168 Supra para 58  
169 R Jooste The Comparative Guide to the old and new Companies Act (2012),  1st Edition, Juta General 
Law Editors at 387-388 
 46 
circumstances where the requirements of s 163(1) are not satisfied.170 The court’s broad 
discussions on the legal principles that surround s 163 have shed light on the locus standi 
of the section. The locus standi of the remedy has been widened to include shareholders, 
directors and related persons but it continues to protect the vested interests of parties in 
the company. 
 
(c) Count Gotthard S.A. Pilati v. Witfontein Game Farm171  
 
The case involves a dispute that arose between the two shareholders of Witfontein Game 
Farm. The minority shareholder, with a 49% interest in the company, was the applicant 
seeking relief from the alleged oppressive conduct from the majority shareholder. In this 
case the minority shareholder was not granted relief under the oppression remedy not on 
the basis of his shareholding capacity but rather the Judge concluded that the acts or 
omissions of the majority shareholder in the case did not disregard the interest of the 
minority shareholder which is an essential requirement under s 163 in order to be granted 
relief. The decision of the Judge illustrates that s 163 gives the courts wide discretion in 
providing a platform for the protection of shareholder and director interests and rights. 
Section 163 remains a platform for the protection of minority shareholder interests and as 
stated by the Judge; ‘[h]uman dignity of a minority shareholder is enshrined in s 10 of the 
Constitution and is part and parcel of the pacta sunt servanda principle.172 Minority 
shareholders are to be held to the same regard as majority shareholders regardless of the 
financial interest in a company and the locus standi of s 163 reiterates that point. 
However the courts in applying s 163 will ensure that the conduct complained of falls 
within the strict scope of the remedy ie ‘oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
disregards interests.’ The precise question is whether the harm which the applicant has 
suffered is something he or she is entitled to be protected from.’173  
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          The Judge concludes by quoting Cassim on the application of s 163, ‘[i]n all 
likelihood a judicial construction will be given (one hopes) to extend rather than to limit 
the remedy (following the approach under the previous regime).’174 The decision made 
by the Court in this case illustrates that s 163 continues to be a remedy to provide 
shareholders both majority and minority with relief from oppressive conduct- but like its 
predecessor, the courts are leery to provide relief in instances where the oppressive act or 
omission affects the shareholder or director beyond their shareholding capacity.  
 
(d) Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v. Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd175 
  
In Visser the court clarifies that the relief offered to directors through the oppression 
remedy in s 163, goes hand in hand with the common law and statutory director duties. 
The case involved a dispute between Goede Hoop Sitrus (GHS) and Visser Sitrus (VC) in 
the approval of the transfer of shares. As such, VC sought to compel GHS to register the 
transfer by claiming relief in terms of s 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 
Act).176  The court explains that although the Act gives the Courts a wide and unfettered 
discretion to provide relief from an act or omission that is either oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly disregards interests of the applicant, shareholders and directors 
should be weary not to abuse the remedy as a means to furnish personal interests. The 
honourable judge noted that, 
             ‘I can see that the court might more readily intervene in the case of conduct of 
shareholders because they are not subject to the same fiduciary constraints as directors 
and minority shareholders, thus do not have the same safeguards. Despite scattered 
statements in case law to the effect that shareholders must vote in what they bona fide 
consider to be the best interests of the company, shareholders may generally consult their 
own interests. They are not subject to the fiduciary duties of directors.’177 
 
        The court clarifies that in most instances directors do not hold a vested financial 
interest in the company but are affected by any outcomes within the company; therefore 
the protection of their interests from oppressive conduct is of paramount importance. 
Section 163 provides the platform for that protection of the interests and rights of 
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directors. The statutory and common law duties of directors such as, to act ‘in good faith 
and for a proper purpose; in the best interests of the company; and with the degree of 
care, skill and diligence …’ 178  continue to be held to a high standard and will be 
considered in providing relief to directors. The expansion of the oppression remedy has 
created a platform for protection of directors’ interests, which in many cases are non-
financial interests, from oppressive conduct.  
 
4.3 Analysis 
A number of cases reveal that s 163 continues to be a platform to seek redress from 
oppressive conduct.179 In these cases the courts have yet to award locus standi to claims 
arising in creditor, employee or supplier capacity. To date, courts have established the 
following principles on the interpretation of s 163;   
          ‘… the fact that the Act provides for a new ground on which an applicant can rely, 
namely conduct that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; the fact that locus 
standi is extended to the directors of the company; the fact that relief can now be sought 
regarding the conduct of a person related to the company; as well as the fact that section 
163 now contains a wide range of relief that the Court can grant.’180 
 
4.3.1 Widened Interpretation of s 163  
 
(a) Court Remedies  
 
Section 163 and case law award courts with a very wide discretion. Section 163 has not 
only expanded the locus standi of the remedy but the remedies in the second part of the 
oppression remedy, s 163(2), relates to the court’s discretion or judicial powers.181 The 
remedy has been widened to provide the court with a non-exhaustive list of remedies that 
may be awarded to an applicant and the courts are empowered to make an orders ‘it 
considers fit’.182 The section provides for seventeen different remedies that are available 
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to an applicant which include but are not limited to: an order restraining the conduct 
complained of, an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be insolvent 
and an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue 
proceedings in terms of Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that the circumstances set out 
in s 131(4) (a) are proven or exist.183 The section is far-reaching184 and it may arguably 
introduce a new dimension to contracts, which must upon conclusion, also be tested 
against the criteria of oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct.185 N Abbey suggests 
that the discretion given to the courts by s 163 is a,  ‘[t]remendous latitude, the South 
African Courts have an opportunity to change the face of the South African corporate law 
forever, through the proper use of their powers - the responsibility they also have is to 
ensure that the cases that are applied are carefully considered.’186 The non-exhaustive 
remedies provided for in s 163(2) will provide applicants with a larger poll of redress 
options and provides the courts with great flexibility in determining suitable relief in 
connection with the facts. 
 
(b) Guidance from foreign jurisdictions 
 
In addition to the wide discretion provided to the courts through s 163(2), the Companies 
Act generally affords the courts with the latitude to consult foreign law in instances 
where the Act or common law does not provide significant clarity. This is provided for in 
s 5(2) of the Act which states that, ‘[t]o the extent appropriate, a court interpreting or 
applying this Act may consider foreign company law.’187 The power to consider foreign 
law in the interpretation of the oppression remedy in s 163s’ predecessors did not exist. In 
interpreting s 163, courts have exercised the power [awarded] in s 5(2) in the 
interpretation and application of s 163, by referring to Canadian and Australian 
application of oppression remedy.188 The court in Peel stated that, a proper construction 
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and interpretation of s 163 cannot be achieved lightly without reference to similar 
authorities in foreign jurisdictions.189 Henochsberg seconds this thought and notes that; 
           ‘[c]ourts may look to Canadian and Australian cases for guidelines in the 
interpretation of certain parts of s 163. It must be kept in mind, however that Canadian 
oppression remedy is not limited to shareholders and directors as s 163, but available to a 
wider group of potential applicants, in that s 238 of the CBCA includes security holders 
as a complainant who may access the remedy under s 241. Security holders may include 
certain categories of corporate creditors.’190 
 
        It is interesting to note that the interpretation of the ‘interests of members’191 under 
the oppression remedy of the English Companies Act of 2006, which is referenced  in 
several s 163 cases, encompasses a different approach to that inclusion of non-
shareholders to bring claims under the provision. In the English Companies Act not only 
interests derived from membership are protected under the oppression remedy, although 
they must be reasonably connected to such.192South African courts have exercised the 
right in s 5(2) of the Act to further interpret and apply s 163 despite the differences that 
may exist within the provisions. This has assisted in providing further guidance and 
clarity on the application of the remedy and exploring its full potential. However the 
narrow interpretation of s 163 has hindered the flourishing and popularity of the remedy 
in comparison to the jurisdictions it was borrowed from. 
 
(c) Locus standi 
 
As noted in the previous Chapter the oppression remedies in Canada, s 238 of the CBCA 
and other provincial corporation Acts, are worded to create a platform for various 
stakeholders to seek refuge from oppressive conduct. The flexibility of the locus standi of 
the Canadian oppression remedy has been praised by several scholars. One states that; 
‘[t]his is a statute that is powerful and comprehensive and does provide a means for the 
righting of corporate wrongs despite the lack of majority- the remedies available are very 
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flexible and far more dynamic and varied than the usual legal remedies.’193 Although 
South Africa has adopted s 163 almost verbatim to s 241 of the CBCA and the courts 
have leaned on foreign case law and legislation to further interpret and apply s 163, the 
provision has not veered much in application from its predecessors. A careful 
consideration of the interpretation given by our courts to the provisions of s 252 of the 
old Companies Act and the provisions in s 163 of the new Companies Act- shows a 
continuing intention by the legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, rather than to 
limit them.194 It can be concluded from legislation and the developing case law on the 
oppression remedy that in South African corporate law the oppression remedy is not a 
platform for stakeholders to seek redress from oppressive conduct.  It is evidenced in the 
above case law that the remedy continues to follow the precedents set out in early cases 
such as Elder and in Barnard. Under s 163courts have been urged to, ‘…consider case 
law on s 252 with great caution due to the difference in wording and also the approach to 
be adopted in terms of the new Act.’195 It can be argued that the courts’  interpretation 
and application of s 163 in relation the sections’ predecessors, will continue to limit the 
locus standi of the remedy despite the wide discretion it awards  the courts. 
Cassim comments on the influence of the precedent set by s 111bis of 1926 and s 252 
of 1973, he notes;  
            ‘[a]lthough the remedy has developed over the years, like its predecessor the 
oppression provision will only apply if the oppressive conduct against the director or 
shareholder is within his capacity as a shareholder or a director. This principle is likely to 
continue to apply in view of the similarity of the wording of s 163 of the new Act to its 
predecessors, so that a shareholder-applicant may complain of oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct only where this affects the shareholder qua shareholder and a director –applicant 
only where he or she is affected qua director as opposed to oppression or prejudice in 
some other capacity for instance as a creditor or a tenant.’196 
 
As noted earlier, the oppression remedy provisions are a necessary safeguard of 
the rights of the minority stakeholders in a company and the remedy is one of the most 
powerful weapons in the arsenal of shareholders and other corporate stakeholders.197 The 
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only corporate stakeholders that s 163 awards locus standi are directors and shareholders 
which are specified by the Act. Although the remedy has widened to include the 
protection of the interests of directors and related persons, it is evident through case law 
that the remedy continues to be a platform within company law that ensures that only 
those who hold a significant interest in the outcome of the business are protected from 
any acts or omissions that are oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards their 
interests. Court decisions have made it clear that although the s 163 is drafted similarly to 
s 241 of the CBCA, in South Africa the remedy has yet to develop beyond its 
applicability to various stakeholders. As argued in one of the first High Court judgments 
dealing with the interplay between s 163 and s 165 of the Companies Act 2008, the East 
London High Court held that s 163 of the Companies Act is designed to deal with internal 
strife amongst shareholders and/or directors of a company and is not designed to deal 
with the company’s relationship with external parties.198  
 
4.4 The influence of the principles of majority rule and non-intervention on s 163 
 
The principles of majority rule and non-intervention rule continue to play a significant 
role in the interpretation and application of s 163. As observed earlier, South Africa has 
adopted a wide shareholders’ remedy from the Canadian oppression remedy. However, 
its potentially wide remedy may be limited by application of majority rule.199 As already 
noted in the cited cases,200 the oppression remedy may provide a platform to bring a 
claim against oppressive conduct. However the courts continue to apply the long-standing 
principles of majority rule and the non-intervention when relating the remedy. The 
doctrine of majority rule is defined in South African case law as; 
         ‘… becoming a shareholder in a company a person undertakes by his contract to be 
bound by the decisions of the prescribed majority of shareholders, if those decisions on 
the affairs of the company are arrived at in accordance with the law, even where they 
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adversely affect his own rights as a shareholder… that principle of the supremacy of the 
majority is essential to the proper functioning of companies.’201 
 
And the principle of non-intervention or internal management is explained as follows;  
‘…based on the premise that within the framework of the Companies Act, 
companies are self-governing republics in which the majority should be allowed to 
govern unhindered by outside interference. From this follows two basic rules: the ‘Non-
Intervention’ Rule and the ‘Proper Plaintiff’ rule, both are subject to common law and 
statutory exceptions.’202 
  
The principles of majority rule and non-intervention continue to play a pivotal 
role in decisions made by the courts as to the power of shareholders and directors. Case 
law notes that despite the unfairness that may exist because it is [the act or omission] a 
consequence of being a shareholder the courts will often adhere to the majority rule.203  
This has further limited the influence of the remedy and weakened the effectiveness of s 
163 in that;  
‘[i]f the majority shareholders conduct themselves in a manner that may harm the 
company, the harm may not be seen as unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholder- 
the majority may simply decide to allow the harmful conduct, the harm done to the 
company is harm done to the shareholders and if a minority shareholder disagrees then it 
is merely a consequence of being a shareholder.204  
 
This not only limits the scope for directors and shareholders but limits the ability 
to bring an oppressive act or omission for stakeholders generally. As noted by N Abbey;  
‘[i]f these fundamental principles are not clarified within the South African 
company law, the uncertainty and confusion may be perpetuated when applying the 
shareholder remedy under s 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act - now that s 163 of the 
2008 SA Companies Act empowers the court to do much more, it is hoped that the 
interpretation of the majority rule will not be a factor inhibiting the potential for better 
shareholder remedies.’205  
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As the oppression remedy is said to, ‘… be interpreted accordance with broad 
standards of fairness and ethical business behaviour,’206 the South African courts are not 
in the wrong by continuing to apply the principles of majority rule and non-intervention 
in the interpretation and application of s 163 however, this has further narrowed the 
approach by courts in application of the remedy. As the English courts note that the 
remedy should not be ‘… a license to do whatever the individual judge happens to think 
fair and that well established principles should not be abandoned in favour of some 
wholly indefinite notion of fairness,’207 hence the influence of the doctrines of majority 
rule and non-intervention on s 163 is an issue that requires clarification from the courts, 
to truly develop the influence of the remedy in South African corporate law and provide 
various stakeholders with a proper remedy through s 163.208 As noted, considering that 
majority rule is an axiomatic doctrine of company law, various jurisdictions have to 
consider how they can develop the oppression remedy as a means to prevent its arbitrary 
use209- the very wide jurisdiction and discretion of the oppression remedy confers on the 
court must, however, be carefully controlled in order to prevent the section from itself 
being used as a means of oppression.210 
 
4.5   Summary  
The oppression remedy in South African corporate law has developed beyond the 
protection of merely those holding a shareholding interest in the company. The locus 
standi has been widened to protect the interests of directors and related persons. In Peel 
the judge noted that, ‘[t]his remedy must be interpreted having in mind, not only the 
contents of the preamble to the new Companies Act namely to, inter alia, “provide 
appropriate legal redress for investors and third parties with respect to companies.”’211 
Section 163 provides for the protection of the rights and interests of shareholders as Peel 
suggests, however, as the decisions in Visser, Kudumane and Witfontein Game Farm 
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illustrate, redress for third parties ie various stakeholders, to date has not been achieved 
on the most part and the interpretation of its predecessor may be intrusive when 
interpreting some of the concepts of s 163.212The precedent set by the courts in 1926 and 
1973 continue to play a pivotal role in the interpretation of s 163 regardless of the fact 
that the wording of the remedy has evolved. As its predecessors, s 163 permits applicants 
to complain of acts or omissions that affect them in their capacity as a shareholder or 
director. In instances where the act or omission affects the applicant beyond shareholding 
and directorship eg as an employee or supplier the legislation does not carter for such 
applicants.   
         Cheffins concludes the following on the success of the oppression remedy in 
Canada, 
          ‘[g]iven the absence of procedural barriers, the wide scope of conduct which is 
covered, and the broad range of remedies which are available under the oppression 
remedy, it should not be surprising that this remedy has become the most important under 
Canadian corporation legislation213- Canadian oppression law provides useful insights 
into the issues which are confronting, and will continue to confront,… courts, legislators, 
and academics.’214 
 
      The procedural barriers that characterize s 163 ie the principles of non-intervention 
and majority rule, have played a role in the narrow interpretation of s 163. Despite its 
narrow definition, the oppression remedy in South African corporate law remains a 
crucial mechanism to safeguard the interest shareholders.215 The remedy has evolved and 
relief under the remedy has become available to one other stakeholder other than 
shareholders. However, the 2008 Companies Act remains rather weak in the application 
of the oppression remedy. Case law reveals that relief for stakeholders beyond directors 
and shareholders continue not to fall within the scope of the oppression remedy in South 
African corporate law.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Chapter presents the recommendations and conclusions from the analysis in this 
dissertation. The recommendations focus on widening of the interpretation of the 
oppression remedy in South Africa. 
5.1   Conclusion  
With the development of corporate law, stakeholder inclusivity has become an important 
principle in the success of businesses. As emphasized in this dissertation, the oppression 
remedy as applied in Canada provides a platform for redress to various stakeholders by 
the wide locus standi in s 238. Despite the seeming similarities between s 241 of the 
CBCA and s 163 of the South African companies Act, s 163 continues to be applied and 
interpreted narrowly to safeguard the interests and rights of stakeholders that are 
expressly stated in the section. Although s 163 has widened its locus standi, widened its 
scope and provided non-exhaustive remedies, the narrow interpretation to s 163 provides 
redress to only those stakeholders who hold a vested interest within the company ie 
shareholders and directors. The narrow approach to the s 163 has weakened the remedy 
and limits its flexibility to provide redress to various stakeholders. Section 163 awards 
courts with a wide and unfettered discretion but the courts continue to interpret the 
section narrowly in line with precedent set by the sections’ predecessors. As South 
African corporate law is no longer centred on the principle of shareholder primacy, one 
would expect that like s 241 of the CBCA, s 163 would award standing to a wide range of 
stakeholders in an attempt to protect all stakeholders from the abuse of power in the 
corporation.  
When interpreting the broader ambit of the remedy and comparing it with other 
jurisdictions, it is important to bear in mind that South Africa already has a robust 
protection for stakeholders such as employees and consumers through the labour laws 
and consumer protection laws. Given the extensive protection provided to stakeholders in 
separate legislation an additional remedy for stakeholder protection in the Companies Act 
would not be suitable. As discussed, South African corporate law is not characterized by 
 57 
a pluralistic approach to stakeholder inclusion but rather stakeholder interests are only 
taken into account when it is in the best interest of the company ie the enlightened 
stakeholder approach. The broader interpretation of s 163 through the judicial 
transplantation of Canadian jurisprudence would be line with the enlightened shareholder 
approach and with the aims of the Companies Act 2008. Section 7(k) provides that the 
Act aims to, ‘… provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed 
companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders…’216 The wider interpretation of s 163 will be a positive move in South 
African corporate law as it will allow for the flexibility of the remedy through the 
inclusion of stakeholders. Although the decision in Peel encourages courts to lean on 
foreign legislation to ensure the boarder interpretation of s 163, South African courts are 
to circumspect to ensure that the broader interpretation of the remedy works within the 
South African corporate law context.  
5.2    Recommendations 
Based on the analysis presented in this dissertation, recommendations in the following 
two critical areas can be identified and emphasized to improve the South African 
oppression remedy through the judicial transplantation of s 241 of the CBCA in s 163 
case law.    
5.2.1    Judicial Transplantation of s 241 of the CBCA 
The judicial transplantation of the interpretation and application of s 241of the CBCA to 
address the shortcomings of s 163 is much faster in addressing the weaknesses identified 
in this study than the complete amendment of the oppression remedy as a means of 
expanding the locus standi of s 163. Judicial transplantation allows transplantation 
through judicial decision making rather than the complete borrowing of a legal aspect. 
Through the judicial transplantation of legal principles judges resort to comparative law, 
as they enjoy a relatively greater expertise in such practice - this concentration guarantees 
that the borrowed concepts are not irrelevant to the domestic system since the use of 
comparative law bestows judges with a significant latitude regarding decisions on when 
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to borrow and from which source.217  As emphasized by P Legard, in comparative law it 
is important to keep in mind that specific rules relate to the culture in which the rule is 
enacted.218 Shareholders and stakeholders relationships in the South African Companies 
Act are governed by the enlightened shareholder approach. The Act to some extent 
safeguards the interests of different stakeholders219- however the clear implication of this 
common-law and statutory principle is that the interests of stakeholders other than the 
shareholders of the company have received no formal, legal recognition under the Act.220 
Thus, the broader interpretation and application of s 163 to carter for the inclusion of 
various stakeholders in s 163 can be achieved if the remedy is interpreted and applied in 
line with Canadian case law on s 241.  
The judicial transplantation of the Canadian oppression remedy would mean that 
rather than seeking to further amend s 163 as suggested by N Abbey,221 the South African 
courts would use the wide discretion awarded by s 163 to interpret and apply the remedy 
in light of the Canadian judicial decisions. As already discussed in this dissertation, s 163 
was heavily influenced by the oppression remedies in foreign jurisdictions hence when 
legislature has found inspiration in foreign statutes, it is only natural for judges to study 
the way in which these statutes have been interpreted and implemented in their country of 
origin.222 Case law adjudicated under s 163 reveals that judges are aware that to fully take 
advantage of the protections offered by s 163 a wider interpretation and application of the 
                                                        
217 D Barak- Erez (2008), ‘The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Aspects,’ 537 U.S. 186 at 487 
218 Legrad op cit note 13 at 115. The author signifies the relationship that exists between culture ie either 
political, culture or social culture or economic culture and legal transplantation. That discussed that it is 
important to determine whether a legal aspect is consistent with the culture in the jurisdiction in which it 
seeks to be transplanted.  
219 The Companies Act affords creditors, trade unions and employees with rights. An example is trade 
unions right to institute proceedings to prevent the company from doing anything inconsistent with the Act  
(s 20(4)), have access to financial statements for the purposes of initiating business rescue proceedings (s 
128)  and must receive notice of any loan or financial assistance given to directors, prescribed officers or 
related or inter-related companies (s 45(5)) 
220 Cassim op cit note 17 at 514 
221 Abbey op cit note 73 (2012), In her thesis she advocates for  the amendment of s 163 in order to make 
the statutory provisions clearer regarding the duties and powers of individuals within the company. Her 
recommendations to ensure that the oppression remedy reaches its full potential in South African corporate 
law include the removal of the binding aspect of the Memorandum of Incorporation and the effects the 
principle of majority rule amongst others.  
222 See further discussion in MW DeLaquil (2006), Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts, 69 Albany 
Law Review 697-707. The article discusses the role courts play in implementing foreign principles within 
the court room.  
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remedy is required. This is achieved by seeking further interpretation of s 163 from 
jurisdictions with a similar provision ie s 241 of the CBCA. The liberal approach taken  
by Canadian courts alluded to earlier, in  the determination of questions of standing to 
seek relief against oppression223 and the judicial transplantation of these principles would 
further develop s 163 into a remedy safeguards all stakeholder interests from the abuse of 
power in corporations to a certain extent. 
The benefits of the wide interpretation of the Canadian oppression remedy by the 
South African courts would mean providing a platform for the flexibility of the remedy 
and a means to narrow the imbalance of power and inequality that exists between various 
stakeholders in the company. The current status where s 163 applies only to shareholders 
and directors disregards the interests of other stakeholders and unfairly prejudices them. 
The use of the wide discretion awarded by ss 238 and 241in the CBCA, to safeguard the 
interests of various stakeholders within the company regardless of the interest the 
stakeholder holds by Canadian courts is thus instructive for South Africa. Through 
judicial transplantation the courts can still adopt a teleological interpretative approach 
that plugs any loopholes in the stakeholders’ protection.224 This which will open the 
remedy to wider interpretation and set precedent for various stakeholders to bring a claim 
under s 163. 
The further interpretation and development of s 163 beyond the precedent set out 
in the ss’111bis of 1926 and 252 of 1973 will provide a platform for the inclusion of 
various stakeholders to seek redress from oppressive conduct. Canadian case law reveals 
that various stakeholders have been awarded locus standi under the oppression remedy 
regardless of the interest they hold in the company. On the basis of that broad legislative 
mandate, it has been held that standing is not to be construed narrowly225- the courts have 
placed more importance on determining whether the act or omission in question falls 
within the scope of the remedy ie ‘oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
disregards the interests’ of an applicant rather than focusing on who has locus standi 
under the remedy. If the South African courts widely interpreting s 163 and lean on 
                                                        
223McGuinness op cit note 10 at  971 
224 Blackman op cit note 210 at  37 
225 McGuinness op cit note 11 at 970 
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Canadian case law for a broader interpretation and application of the remedy this will 
provide a starting point for s 163 to provide redress to various stakeholders not expressly 
protected by s 163.   
Widening the interpretation of s 163 through judicial transplantation of s 241 of 
CBCA will improve the South African approach by widening the inclusion of various 
stakeholders, protecting the interests of security holders and by offering protection for 
anticipated oppression. As alluded to in Chapter 2, s 238 of the CBCA also provides 
locus standi to any ‘security holder’ which includes a variety of classifications of 
shareholders, ‘beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial owner, of a 
security of a corporation or any of its affiliates.’226 Transplantation would thus provide 
relief to all security holders which is not presently available under s 163. Under s 163 the 
holders of beneficial securities are not awarded locus standi they do not fall within the 
definition of a shareholder in s 1 of the Act. Yet holders of a beneficial interest in shares, 
although not formally yet registered with the company, should be considered under the 
provision, as they have legitimate corporate interests which can be harmed prior to them 
becoming registered members.227 Thus, denying beneficial security holders’ locus standi 
under s 163 on the basis of not being a registered shareholder is rather unfair- as modern 
stock markets are characterized by persons who purchase shares through stock exchanges 
and do not bother to register themselves because of the length of time involved.228 The 
further interpretation of s 163 through the Canadian case law will provide room for the 
inclusion of applicants that may hold other forms of securities but do not fall within the 
definition of shareholder in s 1 of the Act. The legislators’ oversight in narrowly defining 
the term shareholder denies various security holders excluded from the definition from 
benefiting from various shareholder remedies throughout the Act.  
In addition, it is important to recall that security holders as per the English 
Companies Act, which also influenced the drafting of s 163, are awarded with locus 
standi under s 994- in which, to qualify for relief under s 994, a holder of a beneficial 
security must show that he has agreed with the existing member for the transfer of shares 
                                                        
226 s 238 (a) of CBCA  
227 Sibanda op cit note109 at 75  
228 W Poon et al, ‘Section 16: A Companies Ordinance a Blunt Sword,’ (1980) HKLJ Vol 10 at 296 
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to bind himself, and that a proper instrument of transfer in respect of those shares has 
been delivered to the transferee or the company.229  Section 163 denies beneficial security 
holders locus standi where in similar provisions, the CBCA and the English Companies 
Act, these beneficial security holders are awarded with status to bring a claim of 
oppression.  
Finally, the wider interpretation of s 163 through the judicial transplantation 
would provide a platform for applicant to claim redress for anticipated oppressive 
conduct ie future oppression. Section 163 does not allow members to apply for relief in 
respect of proposed acts that may harm their interests- it follows that the court should 
have the power to come to the assistance of a minority member where proposed action by 
the majority or any other influential people in the company is clearly unfairly prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable, without having to wait for its effects.230 It is established in several 
South African cases that the section has no application where the complainant relates to 
something which is to be done in the future.231 In Canada however, in a number of 
Ontario cases it was held that relief could be sought by a person who joined the company 
at a time when he or she knew that the affairs of the company were being conducted in 
the manner forming the basis of the complaint - it is sufficient if the applicant is a 
registered holder or beneficial owner of the security at the time he or she brings the 
application.232 A wider interpretation of s 163 will allow disgruntled stakeholders to 
complain of anticipated oppression which currently has no scope. The broad 
interpretation of s 163 through judicial transplantation will create a platform for the 
inclusion of various stakeholders.  
While South African courts are encouraged to interpret and apply s 163 broadly to 
carter for various stakeholders, the courts have to be cognizant of the issues related to 
                                                        
229 Joffe et al Minority Shareholders: Law Practice and Procedure (2011) at 240. 
230 Sibanda op cit note109 at 76  
231 In Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) 225the court concluded that a mere calling of a meeting for the 
purpose of amending the articles so as to enable the director to approve of any proposed transfer of shares 
in a private company (the existing articles requiring the approval of all the shareholders) cannot itself be an 
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Investors Mutual Funds Limited v Empisol (South Africa) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 170 and  Kudumane Investment 
Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese  [2012] ZAGPJHC  116 
232 See Richardson Greenshields of Canada Limited v Hordo (1993), 10 B.L.R. (2d)  
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intense judicial involvement and the watershed of alternative remedies that come about as 
a result of a broaden interpretation of the oppression remedy.  
(a) Intense Judicial Involvement  
The courts through the oppression remedy play a significant role in attempting to 
reconcile both the shareholder and various stakeholder interests. The remedy provides the 
courts with the power to intervene in the affairs of a corporation at the behest of a 
complainant where it is necessary to prevent or protect the complaint from or to stop, 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or similar conduct of the corporation. 233  This awards 
courts with intense involvement in the corporate governance of companies. This has 
become a leading criticism of a wide interpretation to the oppression remedy.  The 
intense judicial involvement in corporate governance and ad hoc decision-making – 
certainly strikes a chord in anyone who is familiar with the operation of the oppression 
remedy and what its practical implications have been for the conduct of corporate 
affairs.234 In the Canadian judiciary the remedy has been used as a method of monitoring 
corporate affairs but has done so in a cautious and limited way.235  There is a thin line 
that exists between the protection of various stakeholder interests through the oppression 
remedy and the intense involvement of courts in corporate affairs in an attempt to settle a 
dispute.  Therefore, in interpreting s 163, South African courts should be cautious in 
ensuring that judicial intervention does not intensely interfere with the governance of 
companies and that the concept of separate legal personality is upheld.  
(b) Watershed of alternative remedies 
In Canada, the wide nature of the oppression remedy and its liberal interpretation by 
courts has given it the ability to be favoured by the bulk of disgruntled minority 
shareholders and stakeholders at the expense of alternative remedies such as derivative 
action or just and equitable liquidation. Traditional remedies such as the shareholder 
derivative action for injuries to the corporation have been significantly displaced by the 
                                                        
233 McGuinness op cit note 11 at 949 
234 Ibid at 7 
235 S Ben-Ishai et al The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially Considered: 1995-2001 (2004) at 90 
 63 
flexible and procedurally simple oppression action.236 Although the broad interpretation 
of s 163 will expedite the flexibility of the remedy, courts need to ensure that 
shareholders and stakeholders are aware of alternative platforms in corporate law 
available to seek redress. This will avoid the misuse of the oppression remedy and evade 
the watershed of alternative remedies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
236 VanDuzer op cit note 70 at 327 
 64 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Articles and Journals 
Ansie Ramalho, ‘Corporate Governance and the call to Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do 
Shareholders Loose Out’, The Corporate Report 18- 22 Available at: 
https://vula.uct.ac.za/access/content/group/9d98efb7-d075-43f7-823a-
eb00914a3008/Introduction%20to%20Corporate%20Governance/ARamalho.pdf     
Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Sridhar Arcot and Valentina Bruno, ‘Corporate Governance in 
the UK: is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working?’ Discussion Paper Series: 
Discussion Paper No. 581 Corporate Governance at LSE 001 (December 2005) Available 
at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24673/1/dp581_Corporate_Governance_at_LSE_001.pdf 
Barak- Erez Daphne, ‘The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Aspects’ (2008), 537 
U.S. 186 Available at: http://www.tau.ac.il/law/conve/Barak-Erez%20-%20paper.pdf 
Beck S M ‘Minority Shareholder Rights in the 1980’s’ in Corporate Law in the 80s 
(1982) Law Society of Upper Canada 
Ben-Ishai Stephanie and Puri Poonam, ‘The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: 1995-2001’ (2004), 30.1  QL.J  79- 113  
Beukes HGJ and Swart WJC, ‘Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd: Ignoring the 
Result-Requirement of Section 163(1)(A) of the Companies Act and Extending the 
Oppression Remedy Beyond its Statutorily Intended Reach,’ (2014) PER Volume 17 No 
4 page 1691-1708 Available at: http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2014/49.pdf 
Blair Margaret and Stout Lynn ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (2001) 85 
VLR   
Cassim Rehana and Cassim Femida M, ‘The Reform of Corporate Law in South Africa’ 
(2005) International Company and Commercial Law Review 16 (10), 411-419 
 65 
Cheffins Brain ‘The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience’ 
10 JIL 350 Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1623&context=jil 
Corfield Andrea ‘The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate 
Governance: A preliminary Analysis’ (1998), 5 BLR 10 2 2 
DeLaquil Mark Wendell, ‘Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts’ (2006), 69 Albany 
Law Review 697-707 
Dickerson Robert W.V, Howard John L, Getz Leon and Bertrand Robert J, ‘Proposals for 
a New Business Corporations Law for Canada’ (1971) Available at 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/ic/RG35-1-1971-I-eng.pdf   
Farrar John H, ‘Corporate Governance and the Judges’ (2003) BLR 65 Available at: 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1243&context=blr 
Legrad Pierre, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”' (1997), 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & 
Comp. L. 111 Available at:  
Letza Steve, Sun Xuiping William and Kirkbride James ‘Shareholding versus 
Stakeholding:  A Critical Review of Corporate Governance’ in Corporate Governance: 
An International Review (2004), 12(3) 242-262 
Lynch Elaine, ‘Section 172: a ground-breaking reform of director's duties, or the 
emperor's new clothes?’ (2012) Comp. Law 33(7) 196-203 (2016) Sweet & Maxwell and 
its Contributors 
Macdonald Paul and Levine Jeffery, ‘Creditors’ use of the Oppression Remedy and the 
Mareva Injunction to Protect Corporate  Assets’ (May 2009) Available at 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/PMacdonald_Creditors_%20Use%20of%20the%20Oppres
sion%20Remedy_0609.pdf 
Miles Lillian ‘Company Stakeholders: Their Position Under the New Framework’ 
(January/February 2003) Amicus Curiae Issue 4512 Available at http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/3507/1/1264-1320-1-SM.pdf 
 66 
Pooh Winston and Loh Christine, ‘Section 16: A Companies Ordinance a Blunt Sword,’ 
(1980) HKLJ Vol 10 
Sibanda A, ‘The Statutory Remedy for Unfair Prejudice in South African Company 
Law’(2013) JJS 38(2) 
Ziegel J.S, ‘Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution- An Anglo 
Canadian Perspective’43 UTLJ 58(1): 48 
Books 
Blackman MS, Jooste Richard D and Everingham Geoff K, Commentary on the 
Companies Act (2002), Juta & Co, South Africa 
Cassim, Farouk H.I, Cassim Maleka F, Cassim Rehana, Shev Joanne and Yeats 
Jacqueline, Contemporary Company Law (2011) 1st ed Juta & Co Ltd 
Delport P.A , Havenga M, Vermaas M, Pretorius J.T  Hahlo’s South African Company 
Law Through Cases: A Source Book (1999) 6th ed, Juta & Co, South Africa  
Delport Piet, Vorster Quintus, Burdette David, Esser Irene-Marie and Lombard Sulette,  
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2014), 1st ed, Lexis Nexus, Durban 
Dennis Peterson H, Shareholders Remedies in Canada (2009), Lexis Nexus, Canada  
Donaldson Thomas and Dunfee Thomas W, Ties that bind: A Social Contract Approach 
to Business Ethics (1999), Harvard College Press, US  
DuPlessis Jean, McConvill James and Bagaric Mirko, Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (2005) 1 edition, Cambridge University Press, US  
Horrigan Bryan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates Models 
and Practices Across Government Law and Business (2010), Edward Edgar Publishing 
Limited, UK 
Joffe Victor QC, Drake David and Richardson Giles, Minority Shareholders: Law 
Practice and Procedure (2011), 4th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 67 
Jooste Richard, The Comparative Guide to the old and new Companies Act (2012), 1st 
Edition, Juta General Law Editors 
Kneale Clive, Corporate Governance in Southern Africa (2012), Chartered Secretaries, 
South Africa  
Malin Chris A, Corporate Governance (2004), Oxford University Press, UK  
McGuinness, Kevin Patrick and Johnson, William C.V The Law and Practice of 
Canadian Business (1999) Butterworths, Toronto 
 Phillips Robert A, Stakeholder Theory: Impacts and Prospects (2011) Edward Edgar 
Publishing, US 
 Post James E, Preston Lee E and Sachs Sybille, Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder 
Management and Organizational Wealth (2002), Stanford University Press, US 
Stein Carl and Everingham Geoff, New Companies Act Unlocked: A Practical Guide 
(2011), Siber Ink, Cape Town  
Sutherland H Company Law of Canada (1993) 6th  ed, Carswell, Toronto 
VanDuzer Anthony John, The Law of Partnerships and Corporations (2003), 2nd ed, 
Irwin Law Inc, Toronto  
Cases 
Apco Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Apco Worldwide Inc 2008 (5) SA 615 (SCA) 
Aspeck Pipe v. Mauer Berger 1968 (1) SA 517 (C):525 
Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd [2008] 2 All SA 272 (C) 
BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 S.C.R 560, 2008 S.C.C 69 
Ben-Tovim v Ben: Tovim 2001 (3} SA 1074 (C) 
Bernard v Montgomery, 36 BLR 257 261 (Sask. Q.B. 1987) 
 68 
Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc [1987] 60 OR (2d) 737 
Bayly and Others v Knowles 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA 
Calmont Leasing Ltd. v Kredl (1993) 142 AR 81 
Canada Opera Co v 670800 Ontario Inc  [1989] 69 OR (2D) 532 (HCJ) 
Carrington Viyella v Taran (Que SC 1983) (unreported) 
Chrysler Canada Ltd. v Richmond Plymouth (BCSC 1988)(unreported) 
Count Gotthard S.A. Pilati v. Witfontein Game Farm  and Others [2013] ZAGPPHC 12 
Csak v Aumon [1990] 69 DLR. (4th) 567 (Ont.HCJ) 
Dodge v Ford Motor Co 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919) 
Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo Transvaal Collieries [1979] 3 S Afr L 713 (Wit 
Local Div). 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 
Elder v Elder & Watson [1952] SC 
Exparte Avondon Trust (Edms) Bpk 1968 (1) SA 340 (T):342 
First Edmonton Place v. 315888 Alberta Ltd [1988] 40 BLR 28 
Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189 
Gainers Inc. v. Pocklington (1992) 132 AR 35 
Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partnership Ltd v [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] Bus LR 
1521 
Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd [1979] 2 Sfr LR 525, (D&C Local Div) 
Grancy Property Limited v Manala (665/12) [2013] ZASCA 57 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] CH 286 
 69 
Hickman v Oban Investments [2010] ZAGPJHC 9 
Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd (1979) 3 S Afr LR 170 (Wit 
Local Div) 
Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd. v. Northern Cape Manganese Company & 2 others 
2012 SA (GSJ) 
Larrett v Coega Development Corporation and 2 others Case No. EL 1139/2013 
Lourenco v Ferela [1998] (3) SA 281 (T)  
Louw and Others v Nel 2011 (2) SA 172(SCA), 
Mason v Intercity Properties, 37 BLR  6, 29 (Ont. CA 1987) 
McMillan v Pott [2011] 1 S Afr LR 511 (WCC) 
Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and Orphans Fund v Telus Communications Inc. 
[2003] OJ No 128 (QL) (Sup Ct) 
Moriaruty v Slater [1989] 67 OR.(2d) 758 (HCJ) 
Murphy v. Phillips (1993) 12 BLR (2d) 58 (Ont Gen Div) 
Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd  [1993] 11 BLR (2d) 218 (Ont Gen Div) 
O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 All ER 961 (HL) at 966g-h and 968ab. This 
Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 (2) SA 331 (GSJ) 
Porteus v Kelly 1975 (1) SA 219 (W) 225 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company, [1969] 3 S Afr L 629 (S Afr SC) 
R v Sands Motor Hotel Ltd [1984] 36 Sask R 45 (QB) 
Re Abraham and Inter Wide Invs Ltd.20 DLR.4th 267 275 (Ont.HC) 
Re Bury,12 DLR 4th 451 453 (Ont HC.1985) 
 70 
Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp 43 OR2d 128 137 (Ont CA 1983) 
Re Peterson v Kanata Investments Ltd 60 DL.3d 527) 
Richardson Greenshields of Canada Limited v Hordo (1993), 10 B.L.R. (2d) 
Royal Trust Corp of Canada v Hordo (1993), 10 B.L.R. (2d) 86 (Ontario General 
Division) 
Sparling v. Javelin Int'l Ltd., [1986] R.J.Q. 1073 
Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v. Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZAWCHC 
Guidelines 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations (March 2003) Available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/principles-and-recommendations-
march-2003.pdf  
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, ‘Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ (April 2004) Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf 
South African Company Law of the 21st Century: Guidelines of Corporate Law Reform 
(May 2004), Department of Trade and Industry Available at: 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf 
 
Legislation and Statutes 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Australian) 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003 (South Africa) 
Employment Equity Act No 55 of 1998 (South Africa) 
Canada Business Corporation Act RSC 1985 c C44 (Canadian) 
 71 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 (South Africa) 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (South African) 
Companies Act 1985 ch 6 (United Kingdom) 
Companies Act 2006 ch 46 (United Kingdom) 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (South African) 
Corporations Act 2001 (Australian) 
Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1996 (South Africa) 
National Work 2009 (Australian) 
Queensland’s Health and Safety Act 2011 (QLD) (Australian) 
Reports  
Company Law Review Steering Group: Modern Company Law for a Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report Available at www.dti.gov.uk\bbf\co-act-
2006\clr-review\page22794.html\ 
‘Draft Report on Governance for South Africa’ (February 25th 2009) King Committee on 
Governance Available at: 
https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/erm/documents/xx.%20King%203
%20-%20King%20Report.pdf 
King Report of Governance for South Africa (2009), Institute of Directors Southern 
Africa 
Schulschek Jess, Interveiw Summary Report (August 2012) Corporate Governance 
Research Program, Albert Luthuli Centre of Responsible Leadership Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=68F22977B4B9767319AEC51
9D9869F1E?doi=10.1.1.393.5505&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
 72 
The European Combined Code on Corporate Governance (July 2003) Available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/combined_code_final.pdf 
Online Sources  
Dantzer IT, ‘The Oppression Remedy’, (20 June 2013), Commercial Litigation Lens 
Available at: http://lernerscommerciallitigation.ca/blog/post/the-oppression-remedy 
Telstra Group Code of Conduct and Business Principle Available at: 
http://www.telstraglobal.com/attachments/article/440/934_Telstra_Group_Code_Of_Con
duct_Business_Principles[1].pdf 
Merchant R   ‘The Oppression Remedy: Can it be used by a terminated employee who is 
also a shareholder?’(October 2014) Available at: https://www.mcleod-
law.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/McLeod%20Law%20LLP_Employment%20Law%20Up
date_Oppression%20Remedy_Oct%202014.pdf   
Theses 
Abbey, Natasha A., ‘An Insightful Study of the Oppression Remedy under South African 
and Canadian Corporate Law’ (2012) University of Western Ontario - Electronic Thesis 
and Dissertation Repository Paper 830 Available at: 
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2181&context=etd 
 
